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*

For better or worse, we live in a society dominated by the automobile;
Americans are notoriously dependent on automobiles for access to goods
and services, for social and economic development, and for sustenance.
In disaster situations, transportation can be critical to individual and
household recovery efforts, particularly for those in areas with no public
transportation or where public transportation has been disrupted.
FEMA’s statutory mandate charges the agency with “alleviat[ing] the
suffering and damage,” and unsurprisingly, this mandate encompasses
disruptions to local transportation systems; the agency’s statutes and
regulations authorize FEMA to provide financial aid for transportation
needs, including repair or replacement of disaster–damaged personal
vehicles. But to be eligible, FEMA requires proof of an applicant’s auto
accident liability insurance—despite the fact that such insurance would
not have covered the damaged vehicle. The only plausible policy reason
given for this rule is that FEMA will not provide aid for vehicles not in
compliance with state law. However, state mandatory insurance laws exist
to reduce the numbers of uninsured motorists, a goal with little, if any,
discernible relationship to FEMA’s mission of disaster relief. Moreover,
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Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, and research assistants J. Crockett Bailey, III and Andrew
Shaver.
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most uninsured vehicles are owned by low-income households, and the
postdisaster punitive effect on uninsured disaster survivors could violate
FEMA’s antidiscrimination provisions, which include protections on the
basis of economic status. What is more, auto insurance mandates are of
dubious efficacy—raising more questions about the eligibility
requirement. This Article examines and critiques the FEMA auto
insurance mandate in light of the agency’s mission and history, and the
mandate to alleviate disaster-related economic harms to low-income
families. Further, this Article considers both the policy arguments and the
potential for successful challenges to the policy through litigation or
agency procedures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are notoriously dependent on their automobiles.
According the World Bank, there are approximately 800 vehicles for
every 1,000 people in the United States, and more than three-fourths of
1
those are passenger vehicles. Roughly 95% of American households
2
own at least one automobile. Commuting statistics from the 2009 U.S.
Census Bureau show that an overwhelming 86.1% of working
Americans, or about 120 million people, travel an average of 25.1
3
minutes to reach their workplace or return home. Approximately 86%
of those commute in a car, truck, or van, and over 75% of those people
4
drive alone in a passenger vehicle. Although essential to employment,
commuting to work is only a small portion of the miles we drive,
5
representing less than 20% of all trips taken by Americans. For the
vast majority of us, a passenger vehicle is a virtual necessity for access to
services and goods as well as support for family and community
6
interaction and economic and social development.
1. Motor
Vehicles
(per
1,000
People),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.VEH.NVEH.P3/countries/1W?display=default
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2013); Passenger Cars (per 1,000 People), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldban
k.org/indicator/IS.VEH.PCAR.P3/countries/1W?display=default (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
World Bank defines passenger vehicles as four-wheeled vehicles that seat less than nine
persons. See id.
2. ROBIN CHASE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, YOU ASKED DOES EVERYONE IN AMERICA
OWN A CAR? 1 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/cambodia/30486/
Publications/everyone_in_america_own_a_car.pdf.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMUTING IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2009, at 2–3 (Sept. 2011).
4. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
5. Id. at 1 (citing A. SANTOS ET AL., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
SUMMARY OF TRAVEL TRENDS: 2009 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 21 tbl.10
(June 2011), available at http://nhts.ornl.gov/2009/pub/stt.pdf).
6. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NPTS BRIEF: MOBILITY AND
THE MELTING POT 3 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter NPTS BRIEF], available at
http://nhts.ornl.gov/briefs/Mobility%20and%20the%20Melting%20Pot.pdf.
Former
Massachusetts Governor and presidential candidate Mitt Romney said in a 2011 interview:
[T]he government, of course, has a lot of mandates, and I know folks don’t like
that[—]mandates kids go to school, mandates they have to have auto insurance if
[they] have an automobile. And my conservative friends say, “Well, we don’t have
to have automobiles.” And it’s like what state do you live in? Of course you have
to have automobiles in this nation.
Bill O’Reilly, Romney on ‘The Factor’: No Perry Beef, Obama’s Iran Failure and
States’ Right to Mandate, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/
on-air/oreilly/2011/09/14/romney-factor-no-perry-beef-obamas-iran-failure-and-states-rightmandate.
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Populations who cannot drive—those who are too young, too old,
disabled, or ill—rely on others who do drive as public transit options
may be limited or inadequate and are nonexistent in most small towns
7
and rural areas. Studies show that access to a working vehicle has an
8
impact on the ability to find employment.
Lack of adequate
transportation has been cited as a factor in a wide array of social and
health problems, as far reaching as an observed 25% increase in obesity
9
in rural children who cannot access after-school programs and veterans
who report increased health problems due, in part, to inability to reach
10
VA facilities. The need for a vehicle is particularly pronounced among
11
low-income populations.
When disasters occur, this dependence on personal vehicles can be
even more critical in the lives of those affected and their communities.
With public and private services interrupted, facilities destroyed, schools
and hospitals relocated, and families displaced or separated, most
survivors need ongoing, long-term access to transportation to obtain
12
Goods and services within easy reach
even basic necessities.
predisaster may have been destroyed or damaged, requiring individuals
to travel greater distances to find health care, fuel, retail pharmacies,
13
and groceries. Moreover, public transportation may be disrupted for
long periods of time, making individual transportation the only viable

7. See Nicholas Farber, School Buses and Special Needs Transportation: Options for
Policymakers, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/print/transportation/schoolbusneeds08.pdf (noting the need for
“additional mobility for the general population in rural areas, where public transportation is
limited or nonexistent. Around 38 percent of the nation’s rural residents live in a community
without public transportation, and another 28 percent live in a community with few public
transportation options.”); Lisa Margonelli, Thinking Outside the Bus, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011, 9:30 PM) http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/
17/thinking-outside-the-bus/ (reporting that only 5% of Americans use public transit for
work, and only 1.2% of those in rural communities).
8. NPTS BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3 (“The impact of the limited mobility of lower-income
men is not known for the specific individual, but overall such a limited range affects access to
potential employers, and may restrict access to health services, education, shopping at
discount stores, and a vast array of social and recreational activities.”).
9. See id.; Margonelli, supra note 7.
10. See Margonelli, supra note 7.
11. Steven Garasky et al., Transiting to Work: The Role of Private Transportation for
Low-Income Households, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 64, 65 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Alice Fothergill & Lori A. Peek, Poverty and Disasters in the United States:
A Review of Recent Sociological Findings, 32 NAT’L HAZARDS 89, 98, 100 (2004).
13. See id. at 100.
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alternative for those who ordinarily use public transit. Rural citizens
without public transportation options may be the most vulnerable.
Restoring Americans’ access to private transportation would seemingly
be an important priority after a disaster, as it is necessary to promote
independence and return lives to order as soon as possible.
Disaster recovery widely impacts those directly affected as well as
our larger communities and economies. In 2011, the President declared
15
ninety-nine FEMA major disasters, and in 2012, forty-seven. During
that time, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico all
16
had at least one.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
17
Emergency Assistance Act (the “Stafford Act”) authorized the
establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), now a branch of the Department of Homeland Security, which
18
Created through the
spearheads federal response after disasters.
merger of several agencies with disaster-related duties in 1979, and with
19
a legacy beginning in 1803, FEMA is charged with one central purpose:
14. E.g., Rich Sampson, The Return of New Orleans’ Transit Legacy, COMMUNITY
TRANSP.,
June
1–6,
2008,
at
6,
9–12,
available
at
http://web1.ctaa.org/webmodules/webarticles/articlefiles/NORTA.pdf.
15. Disaster
Declarations
for
2011,
FEMA,
http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year/2011?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1=All (last visited
Jan. 20, 2013); Disaster Declarations for 2012, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year
/2012?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1=All (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). The definition of major
disaster, as used by FEMA, is
[a]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water,
winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide,
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or
explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources
of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
44 C.F.R. § 206.2(a)(17) (2011).
16. Disaster Declarations for 2011, supra note 15; Disaster Declarations for 2012, supra
note 15. The other four states and the year of their last major disaster declaration are
Arizona (2010), Michigan (2008), Nevada (2008), and South Carolina (2006). Disaster
Declarations by State, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/state (last visited Jan. 20,
2013).
For FEMA Disasters by year or state, see Disaster Declarations, FEMA,
http://www.fema.gov/disasters (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
18. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf.
19. For a short history of government disaster response agencies and legislations, see
About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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assisting state and local governments “to alleviate the suffering and
damage” caused by emergencies and major disasters through
20
prevention, mitigation, and recovery.
FEMA states that “[t]he
recovery mission seeks to support communities in rebuilding so
individuals, civic institutions, businesses, and governmental
organizations can function on their own, return to normal life, and
21
protect against future hazards.” In a major disaster, the Stafford Act
expressly authorizes grants of financial assistance to households and
individuals for “necessary expenses or serious needs,” recognizing that
among those essentials are funds to repair or replace individuals’
22
personal vehicles.
Despite this directive, survivors seeking FEMA aid to repair or
replace a disaster-damaged vehicle are denied aid unless they can
20. 42 U.S.C. § 5121. Section 5121 states, in relevant portion:
(b) It is the intent of the Congress, by this chapter, to provide an orderly and
continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and
damage which result from such disasters by—
(1) revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief
programs;
(2) encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and
organizations by the States and by local governments;
(3) achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster
preparedness and relief programs;
(4) encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace
governmental assistance;
(5) encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
disasters, including development of land use and construction regulations;
and
(6) providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private
losses sustained in disasters[.]
Id. Most of the powers given to the President by the Act were delegated by President George
H.W. Bush to the Director of FEMA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5164. Exec. Order No. 12,673,
54 Fed. Reg. 12,571 (Mar. 23, 1989). One notable exception is that the President, and not the
FEMA Director, has the authority to declare a major disaster. Id.
21. Region IV Recovery Division, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/region-iv-recoverydivision (last updated Dec. 18, 2012).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (including aid for “transportation”);
see also Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasterassistance-available-fema (last updated Aug. 10, 2012) (listing “disaster-related damaged to a
vehicle” among “necessary expenses and serious needs caused by the disaster” for which
money is available).
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23

provide proof of current auto liability insurance. The reasons for this
precondition to relief are unclear, despite requests to FEMA
representatives in response to assistance denials. The requirement is
not stated within any FEMA statutory authority or regulations and was
never proposed or published in the Federal Register for public
comment. In fact, the requirement is difficult to find among FEMA’s
public information. The hinging of aid for damage or destruction of a
vehicle on liability insurance—and liability insurance only—creates a
disconnect in logic.
Unlike comprehensive or collision auto insurance, liability insurance
has no bearing whatsoever on whether an owner’s car can be repaired,
regardless of the source of the damage. Auto insurance for liability only
covers vehicle (property damage) and medical expenses (bodily injury)
for persons in other vehicles when injured by the insured auto in an at24
fault situation. In a disaster situation, then, pure liability insurance will
not repair or replace a survivor’s automobile. Collision coverage or
comprehensive insurance, on the other hand, will likely pay its insured
parties in full for any damage to their vehicles, and those owners will not
25
need FEMA assistance to continue with the necessity of transportation.
Those with liability coverage only are also eligible for financial
assistance in this category, and SBA loans may be available to those
26
Ultimately, FEMA’s
with sufficient income and assets to qualify.
practice leaves only those with neither collision nor liability to bear the
losses in this category with no assistance, regardless of the level of need.
It is logical to expect this category to include our poorest and most
economically vulnerable citizens.

23. This requirement appears in FEMA’s Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the
Individuals & Households Program handout, FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER:
APPLICANT’S GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALS & HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 15 (2008), available
at http://www.fema.gov/help-after-disaster, and in the FAQ portion of its website, Why am I
Not Eligible for Assistance?, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/why-am-i-not-eligible-assistance
(last updated June 15, 2012).
24. A clear explanation appears in A Consumer’s Guide to: Auto Insurance published by
the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner: “Washington state requires
liability coverage. This covers bodily injury and damage to property that you cause to others
while using your car.” WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE
TO: AUTO INSURANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/auto/c
onsumerguideautoins.pdf.
25. Id.; see also Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
26. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program,
supra note 23, at 4, 6.
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It is said that disasters are great equalizers that strike across
demographic and economic strata, which is often true for the terrible
27
and tragic initial impact on communities following a major disaster.
For low-income households with fewer financial reserves, disaster
28
creates a far more difficult time in recovery.
A number of
commentators and scholars have asserted that FEMA practices have at
29
times failed to assist those most in need, in contravention of Congress’s
express directive to adopt policies which prevent discrimination on the
30
basis of economic status. Despite the centrality of the automobile to
our daily lives, there has been little comment, and apparently no legal
challenge to date, to the policy which denies otherwise qualifying
31
survivors financial assistance for uninsured personal vehicles. In Part I
of the Article, I argue that a mandatory auto liability insurance
requirement is counter to FEMA’s purpose and antidiscrimination

27. Fothergill & Peek, supra note 12, at 89.
28. Id. at 90, 98–101.
29. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster
Recovery Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 48 (2006) (“The federal
emergency response to this unprecedented natural disaster [Hurricane Katrina] suffered from
abysmal planning and a lethargic response [by FEMA] to the needs of hurricane survivors in
the devastated Gulf Coast.”); John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical
Look at FEMA’s Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV.
443, 477–78 (2008) (explaining that FEMA failed victims of Hurricane Katrina in many ways,
namely “fail[ing] to provide adequate information and temporary housing assistance”);
Elizabeth Pierson Hernandez, Comment, Twice Uprooted: How Government Policies
Exacerbate Injury to Low-Income Americans Following Natural Disasters, 14 SCHOLAR 219,
223 (2011) (noting that over 10,000 people in Texas were rejected FEMA housing aid after
Hurricane Dolly).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Section 5151(a) says in relevant part:
Non-discrimination in disaster assistance.
(a) Regulations for equitable and impartial relief operations:
The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such regulations as may be
necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Federal assistance functions at
the site of a major disaster or emergency. Such regulations shall include provisions
for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the processing of applications, and
other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and
impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion,
nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic status.
Id.
31. One of the few legal articles to mention this policy is Hooks & Miller, supra note 29,
at 48 n.105 (“However, FEMA’s procedures in awarding such assistance can exclude lowincome people. For example, benefits to replace vehicles lost in the storm were allocated
only to those who could demonstrate they carried insurance on their vehicles (although such
insurance almost never covers losses from events such as Katrina).”).
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directive and inconsistent with legislative intent. Part II discusses
whether the underlying state law public policy is effective in advancing
FEMA’s articulated reasons for its prerequisite, examining the
effectiveness of mandatory auto insurance laws in reducing uninsured
motorist percentages and costs of accidents overall. Part III examines
whether FEMA’s policy is vulnerable to judicial review or
administrative procedure and how such a challenge might proceed and
ultimately fare. Finally, Part IV concludes that via litigation or methods
short of litigation, FEMA should reconsider and eliminate the
postdisaster auto liability insurance requirement.
II. FEMA’S POLICY REQUIRING DISASTER SURVIVORS TO PROVE
CURRENT AUTO LIABILITY INSURANCE
The source of FEMA’s conditioning assistance for motor vehicles
upon proof of liability insurance is unclear. Searches for public
documents relating how FEMA arrived at this policy have been
fruitless. Nowhere within either the text of the Stafford Act, its
codification, its legislative history, or in any regulations authorizing and
governing FEMA’s activities is auto liability insurance mentioned, nor is
compliance with state auto insurance laws required as a prerequisite to
32
repair or replace a vehicle. Its absence is notable.
Regulations promulgated for FEMA to carry out its mission include
33
a list of factors which may lead to ineligibility for assistance, but auto

32. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207; Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88
Stat. 143; 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.1–.115 (2011); S. REP. NO. 93-778 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070.
33. 44 C.F.R. § 206.113(b). The conditions are as follows:
(b) Conditions of ineligibility. We may not provide assistance under this
subpart:
(1) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who are
displaced from other than their pre-disaster primary residence;
(2) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who have
adequate rent-free housing accommodations;
(3) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who own a
secondary or vacation residence within reasonable commuting distance to
the disaster area, or who own available rental property that meets their
temporary housing needs;
(4) For housing assistance, to individuals or households who
evacuated the residence in response to official warnings solely as a
precautionary measure and who are able to return to the residence
immediately after the incident;
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liability insurance is not among them. Furthermore, as will be addressed
later in this Article, the insurance industry and others have expressed
34
serious doubt as to the efficacy of mandatory insurance laws, making
the punitive actions of FEMA in enforcement of these laws, especially in
this context, even more puzzling.
FEMA’s rationale for the liability insurance predicate to this form of
transportation assistance seemingly appears only in its most informal
policy statements, such as its publication in its “help” manual, its mobile
35
assistance site, and its website. Many applicants see it for the first time
as a code symbol in a response letter from FEMA used to classify and
36
inform applicants of the rejections of requests. For uninsured motorist
applicants seeking assistance with a disaster-damaged assistance, a five-

(5) For housing assistance, for improvements or additions to the predisaster condition of property, except those required to comply with local
and State ordinances or eligible mitigation measures;
(6) To individuals or households who have adequate insurance
coverage and where there is no indication that insurance proceeds will be
significantly delayed, or who have refused assistance from insurance
providers;
(7) To individuals or households whose damaged primary residence
is located in a designated special flood hazard area, and in a community
that is not participating in the National Flood Insurance Program, except
that financial assistance may be provided to rent alternate housing and for
medical, dental, funeral expenses and uninsurable items to such individuals
or households. However, if the community in which the damaged property
is located qualifies for and enters the NFIP during the six-month period
following the declaration then the individual or household may be eligible;
(8) To individuals or households who did not fulfill the condition to
purchase and maintain flood insurance as a requirement of receiving
previous Federal disaster assistance;
(9) For business losses, including farm businesses and selfemployment; or
(10) For any items not otherwise authorized by this section.
Id.
34. See, e.g., Lynn Knauf, Despite Compulsory Coverage Laws, Fight Against UMs
Marches On, INS. J. (Aug. 18, 2003), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/partingshots
/2003/08/18/31637.htm; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured
Drivers, Says Insurer Trade Group, INS. J. (July 25, 2004), http://www.insurancejournal.com/n
ews/national/2004/07/25/44371.htm.
35. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program,
supra note 23, at 15; Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
36. This code system was criticized post-Katrina and raised in plaintiff’s claims in
Ridgely v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 512 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 2008)
(complaining that FEMA’s use of “confusing codes, instead of understandable explanations”
was one process that violated Due Process).

08 HORNSBY (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:13 PM

ROADBLOCK TO RECOVERY

745

letter code with this elaboration will appear: “IVINS-Vehicle - No
Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a
37
vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law.”
In searching for the source of this policy, a list of reasons for denial
to responses appear under the question Why am I not Eligible for
38
Assistance? Four coded items relating to rejection of an individual’s
application seeking assistance to repair or replace a vehicle are among
39
them, and two of the four cite failure to comply with state laws. (The
other one is a similar code for failure to prove the vehicle is registered
40
with the state motor vehicle department.) This is the only instance in
any category on the list where noncompliance with state law is cited as a
reason for individuals or households to fail to qualify for financial
41
assistance.
A. Legislative History of the Stafford Act and FEMA’s IVINS Policy
A review of the legislative history of the Stafford Act’s predecessor
bills, in particular a comprehensive report on disaster response by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), makes it clear that Congress
intentionally eliminated the requirement of insurance as an eligibility
42
factor for individual aid. The CRS report includes a section-by-section
description of the newly passed Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and
discusses the changes made in the bill during conference between the
43
Senate and the House. In its explanation of 314, titled “Insurance
Requirement,” the CRS notes that the compromise committee elected
37.
38.
39.
40.

Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. The four items related to vehicles are:

IVINS-Vehicle - No Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be
provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law.
IVNE-Vehicle - Non Essential: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a
vehicle when a second vehicle is available.
IVNR-Vehicle - Not Licensed/Registered: Disaster assistance may not be
provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms of state law.
IVRC-Vehicle - Cosmetic Damage: There was not enough damage to your
vehicle for you to qualify for this program.
Id.
41. See id. (providing a complete list of rejection codes).
42. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFTER DISASTER STRIKES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 93-288, at 742 (1974).
43. See id. at 742–43.

08 HORNSBY (DO NOT DELETE)

746

4/13/2013 5:13 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:735

to reject the idea of mandatory insurance of any kind as a qualifying
44
factor for receipt of aid for individuals.
Noting the conflicting positions of the administration and the Senate
on this issue, CRS reports that a Senate version of the bill which
expounded a mandatory insurance requirement to any type of public or
private assistance provided was pared down to a very limited
45
The limited requirement, which remains intact in
requirement.
significant part today, applied the requirement only to certain public
46
Even the broader,
entities under specific programs of assistance.
discarded Senate version would not have denied aid to those without
47
insurance after a first disaster: it applied prospectively.
That is,
survivors were to insure replacement property for which they had
received FEMA aid to purchase; otherwise they would be denied aid in
48
a subsequent disaster.
Significantly, one key point of concern raised in opposition to the
requirement was its harsh impact on those whose failure to insure was
49
due to an inability to pay the cost of insurance. Recognition of the
severity of the result postdisaster on low-income families, then, was
44. Id. at 741–42.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 742.
47. Id.
48. Section 314 of the Senate bill required applicants for assistance to obtain any
“reasonably available, adequate and necessary insurance” and provided that property for
which assistance was previously provided was not eligible to receive additional assistance in
the future unless all insurance required by such section had been obtained and maintained. S.
REP. NO. 93-778, at 188 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3082.
49. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-100, at 12 (1973). The report describes:
A provision of the proposed bill will require that loan applicants obtain
insurance, when reasonably available, to cover property losses in future disasters.
Disaster insurance will ensure that financing would be available to help individuals
get back on their feet after disasters and protect the disaster victim from future
losses and increased debt.
The emergency loan program, even as modified by PL 93-24, may in fact
discriminate against the needy. They may not be able to qualify for a loan, since
applicants must demonstrate some ability to repay and, currently, there is no other
special provision to aid needy disaster victims. As an essential component of the
new disaster assistance program, the legislation proposes to make funds available to
the States to provide grants to needy persons affected by disasters. Since the States
already have ongoing and recognized machinery to deal with the needy, such as
State welfare offices, they can more appropriately and expeditiously administer this
type of grant.
Id.
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within the considerations in the debate in Congress as it contemplated
50
the legislation. Some policymakers and legislators proposed adoption
of a national disaster insurance program, similar to the National Flood
Insurance Program, and hearings included comments on the effects that
51
a mandate of insurance would have on the poor.
Speaking in opposition to the proposal that would have required
people to obtain insurance on property repaired or replaced with
FEMA aid, Red Cross officials made a point of its disaster-response
philosophy of “meeting disaster-caused needs, not disaster losses,” and
expressed reservations and strongly held concerns about imposing
52
insurance requirements on low- and middle-income families. The thendirector of FEMA stated his support for a financial aid program in the
form of outright grants to those who could not qualify for low interest
50. See To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief
Legislation Part 5 (Proposed Legislation): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Disaster Relief of
the Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d Cong. 168, 206 (1973).
51. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 188, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3082; See To
Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation Part 5, supra
note 50, at 168. The Senate version, appearing below, was not adopted by Congress, who
rejected the idea of universal disaster insurance as a prerequisite to receiving future
assistance:
Applicants for assistance under this Act must obtain any reasonably available,
adequate and necessary insurance to protect against losses to property which is
replaced, restored, repaired or reconstructed with that assistance.
Property for which assistance was previously provided under this Act is not
eligible to receive additional assistance in the future unless all insurance required by
this section has been obtained and maintained.
S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 188.
52. To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation
Part 5, supra note 50, at 168. Statement of George M. Elsey, President, American National
Red Cross:
[W]e are concerned about the requirement that disaster victims must have
purchased hazard insurance before being eligible for federally funded assistance
after a disaster. . . .
Certainly the Red Cross does not object to requiring those who can afford to do
so to purchase insurance but there will always be a certain number of low or even
middle income families among them older people living on social security or other
pensions, and young families struggling to make ends meet, who may not be able to
afford the cost of insurance even at subsidized rates. . . .
If the legislation you are now considering proposes grants to people whose
income level is so low that they cannot qualify for loans, yet conditions eligibility for
grants on the purchase of insurance against future disaster losses, is it logical to
expect such people to buy and maintain such insurance?
Id. at 168.
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loans made available through the Small Business Administration (but
subject to forgiveness), the only program available at that time to
53
individuals and households.
Then Governor of Virginia, Linwood
Holton, expressed similar sentiments and was unable to support a
54
mandate with which the needy were unable to comply.
Ultimately, the insurance mandate for property procured with
financial assistance from FEMA was removed from the bill, leaving a
55
requirement only for a very limited set of public facilities. The CRC
report states clearly of the adopted bill: “[M]ost important, there is no
requirement for the purchase of insurance for property owned by
individuals. All of the affected programs apply to governmental
activities. Thus, an individual who failed to acquire insurance after a
56
first disaster would suffer no penalty if a second disaster strikes.” This
statement not only reflects the outright rejection of an individual
insurance mandate, but also demonstrates that even under the initially
proposed Senate and Administration version, nothing as harsh as a
57
penalty for first time disaster survivors was on the table. Despite this
history, somehow the insurance requirement for personal vehicles was

53. Id. at 60. Statement of Thomas Dunne, Administrator, Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration:
The provisions of title V on grants to the needy give special recognition that there
are people in this country who don’t have the ability to borrow money. . . .
What we are trying to reach through the need program by these grants are
people who don’t have the ability to borrow. This is special recognition.
Id.
54. Id. at 206.
Virginia:

Statement of Hon. Linwood Holton, Governor, Commonwealth Of

The requirement for the purchase of disaster insurance as a prerequisite for grants
to cover uninsured property losses of needy families is questioned. A portion of the
grant could be used to obtain the insurance initially, but the maintenance of this
insurance by needy families would present a problem . . .
Id. at 193. Governor Holton went on to state, “I don’t see how you can force them to do it if
they don’t have the money to buy it with.” Id. at 206.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 5154 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The current version of the statute retains
virtually the same provisions, though their internal references to other sections have been
updated as modifications have been made over time. Id.
56. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFTER DISASTER STRIKES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 93-288, at 742 (1974).
57. To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation
Part 5, supra note 50, at 73 (statement of Sen. Buckley) (“My understanding of the
Administration bill is that the taking out of disaster insurance would not be a precondition for
help during the first disaster.”).
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grafted into FEMA’s eligibility criteria, in seeming contravention of the
58
Congressional intent. FEMA does not impose any similar insurance
mandate on any additional items in this “Other Needs” category for
which financial assistance may be provided, which includes potentially
insurable items such as medical and dental expenses, personal
59
belongings, and funeral expenses.
Similarly, no other aid eligibility criteria for individuals or
60
households are based on compliance with state laws.
The
complications of FEMA injecting itself into the enforcement of state
auto insurance laws begs the question of whether this is a worthy policy
position. Unlike the recent debate regarding a health insurance
61
individual mandate, auto liability insurance laws have public support.
Some opposed to auto liability insurance laws believe state legislatures
58. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1037, at 90 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3091, 3100. The report describes:
It should be noted that it was the intention of the conferees, by limiting the
applicability of section 314 to sections 402 and 419 of this legislation and section 803
of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, not to require under
this legislation the purchase of insurance with respect to property owned by
individuals.
Id.
59. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 22. FEMA’s report notes:
Other than Housing Needs.
Money is available for necessary expenses and serious needs caused by the disaster.
This includes:
Disaster-related medical and dental expenses.
Disaster-related funeral and burial expenses.
Clothing; household items (room furnishings, appliances); tools (specialized
or protective clothing and equipment) required for your job; necessary educational
materials (computers, school books, supplies).
Fuels for primary heat source (heating oil, gas).
Clean-up items (wet/dry vacuum, dehumidifier).
Disaster-related damage to a vehicle.
Moving and storage expenses related to the disaster (moving and storing
property to avoid additional disaster damage while disaster-related repairs are being
made to the home).
Other necessary expenses or serious needs as determined by FEMA.
Other expenses that are authorized by law.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
61. See AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY &
INSURANCE COMMITTEE RESOURCE GUIDE 15, available at http://www.aamva.org/uploaded
files/mainsite/content/driverlicensingidentification/auto_insurance_financial_responsibility/fr
%20guide.pdf.
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are pressured into seemingly easy fixes by a few constituents who were
62
injured and uncompensated for their losses. Regardless, there is still
good reason to wonder why FEMA is interested in enforcing this
particular set of state laws. In order to properly address this policy
question, it is helpful to examine the development and effectiveness of
state mandatory automobile insurance laws.
B. FEMA’s IVINS Policy and Mandatory Auto Insurance Laws
FEMA’s sole published explanation for the denial of benefits to the
owners of uninsured, disaster-damaged vehicles is that it may deny aid
63
Taking that
to those owners not in compliance with state law.
statement at face value, an examination of these compulsory insurance
laws and their impact is valuable. There is no question that thousands of
individuals suffer injury or loss as a result of the negligence of drivers of
64
uninsured vehicles. “Unlicensed and uninsured drivers are involved in
more than 20 percent of the fatal crashes on America’s highways,” said
Laura Kotelman, in an address at the annual meeting of the National
65
Unrecovered losses caused by
Conference of State Legislators.
uninsured drivers were estimated by the insurance industry at $10.8
66
billion in 2007 alone. States, traditionally the entities who have wide
67
regulatory powers over the insurance industry, have addressed the

62. See Knauf, supra note 34.
63. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No Liability
Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet the terms
of state law.”).
64. Fortunately, the overall number of vehicle accidents has declined dramatically since
2000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Transportation: Motor Vehicle Accidents and Fatalities, in
THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 693 tbl.1103 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/co
mpendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1103.pdf.
65. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34. Ms. Kotelman is Property Casualty Insurers Association
of America’s (PCI)’s regional manager and senior counsel. Id.
66. See Larry Copeland, 1 in 7 Drivers are Not Insured: State Requirements Appear
Ineffective, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Section 1012 states:
(a) State regulation[.]
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to
the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) Federal regulation[.]
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
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uninsured motorist problem in various ways, most commonly by passing
laws that make it mandatory to carry some form of auto insurance and
68
penalize those who do not insure their vehicles.
Motor vehicle insurance mandates were first enacted in
Massachusetts in 1927 and not by another state until New York in 1956
69
and North Carolina in 1957. By 1970, these were still the only three,
but between 1971 and 1976, sixteen states adopted “no-fault” laws that
made first-party insurance mandatory along with compulsory auto
70
liability coverage. The number of state insurance mandate laws grew
slowly after that time, but now forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia require some minimal level of insurance on individually
71
owned automobiles. The type of insurance required, the enforcement
mechanisms, and the penalties for noncompliance vary widely from state
72
to state. The array of mandatory or compulsory insurance laws alone
makes evident the states’ independence in oversight of the auto
insurance industry and the lack of consensus about the most effective
approach.
More basically, the scope of the uninsured motorist problem and
whether mandatory liability insurance laws have an impact on the
problem are issues that are anything but settled. A 1999 study by The
National Association of Independent Insurers found compulsory auto
insurance laws were largely ineffective and might be making the

which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance: Provided, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act,
and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, . . . shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.
Id.
68. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34; AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61,
at 16.
69. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 11.
70. Scott E. Harrington, Taxing Low Income Households in Pursuit of the Public
Interest: The Case of Compulsory Automobile Insurance, in INSURANCE, RISK
MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ROBERT I. MEHR 115, 116
(Sandra G. Gustavson & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1994).
71. Only New Hampshire has no requirement for individuals to insure their vehicles.
INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 1 (2011).
72. Cassandra R. Cole et al., The Uninsured Motorist Problem: An Investigation of the
Impact of Enforcement and Penalty Severity on Compliance, 19 J. INS. REG. 613, 615 (2001);
see AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 25, 27, 38, 50 (comparing, for
example, the approaches of Arkansas, California, Illinois, and Michigan).
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uninsured motorist problem worse in the long run.
It found that
among twelve states that enacted such laws between 1976 and 1984, only
four saw a reduction from the first full year to 1985, and the other eight
74
saw increases in uninsured motorists from 3.5% to 57.9%. For states
that enacted compulsory liability laws post-1985, half saw increases in
75
the uninsured motorist population and half saw decreases. During this
time, the number of claims and the losses caused by so-called
76
“financially irresponsible drivers” went up. Significantly, the Insurance
Research Council’s (IRC) historical data shows a relatively stable rate
of uninsured motorists, somewhere between 13% and 16% between
77
1990 and 2009, during the same time that a number of states enacted
78
their laws.
Even the basic statistics on uninsured motorists, however, can be
difficult to determine with confidence. There are at least four methods
79
of estimating the number of uninsured motorists or motor vehicles,
with no consensus on which gives the most accurate picture. State
agencies, industry organizations, and independent scholars or entities
have used these methods alternatively or in some combination to
generate a projected number and percentage of uninsured vehicles on
80
81
U.S. roads.
The IRC, an insurance industry trade organization,

73. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 615–16; A Failed Mechanism?, INS. ADVOC., Aug. 29,
1998, at 1 (1998).
74. A Failed Mechanism?, supra note 73, at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. (Dec. 2012),
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists.html.
The rate
declined from 14.9% in 2003 to 13.8% in 2007, then rose to 14.3% in 2008 and fell to 13.8 %
in 2009, according to the IRC. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614–15; Compulsory
Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra.
78. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614–15.
79. J. Daniel Khazzoom, What We Know About Uninsured Motorists and How Well We
Know What We Know, 19 J. INS. REG. 59, 64 (2000). The four methods are:
1. Matching of a DMV’s drivers’ registration database against insurers’
databases to identify vehicles that have been registered but not insured.
2. Random sampling of registered vehicles.
3. Comparison of the frequency of claims paid under uninsured motorist
insurance with the bodily injury claims paid under liability insurance.
4. Sampling surveys of the insurance status of automobiles owned by
households.
Id.
80. See, e.g., infra notes 82–86.
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publishes statistics on the percentages of uninsured motorists by state
each year, calculating it by comparing the number of bodily injury
claims (those covered by at-fault drivers’ insurance) with the number of
uninsured motorist claims (those covered by the injured party’s own
82
uninsured motorist insurance).
The IRC compiles the information
from nine auto insurance companies, which collectively represent
approximately 50% of the private passenger auto liability insurance
83
premiums in the United States. This method is considered to be less
84
accurate than either a database or random sampling method, but the
IRC statistics have been relied upon in a number of related studies since
85
1989, all of which would be far less valuable for future comparisons
should the IRC change its method of tracking uninsured motorists in the
future.
J. Daniel Khazzoom, a retired Economics professor from the
University of California-Berkeley, undertook an examination of various
sources of information reported on uninsured drivers, and points out the
86
shortcomings and biases inherent in each methodology. He and others
say that the IRC’s methods upwardly bias the percentage of uninsured
motorists on the road because the method does not account for hit-andrun accidents, liability claims denied for other reasons, the possibility
that vehicle ownership and the driver are not interlinked, uninsured

81. In Uninsured Motorists, the Insurance Research Council describes itself as:
[A] division of The American Institute for Chartered Property and Casualty
Underwriters (The Institutes), a not-for-profit organization dedicated to providing
educational programs, professional certification, and research for the propertycasualty insurance business. The Council’s purpose is to provide timely and reliable
research to all parties involved in the public policy issues affecting risk and
insurance, but the Council does not lobby or take legislative positions. The Council
is supported by leading property-casualty insurance organizations.
INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 40.
82. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77.
83. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 27–28.
84. AAMVA UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP. ET AL.,
STANDARDIZING THE WAY WE MEASURE THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE RATE 9,
available at http://www.aamva.org/uploadedFiles/MainSite/Content/SolutionsBestPractices/B
estPracticesModelLegislation(1)/StandardizingTheWayWeMeasureUninsuredMVRates.pdf.
85. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 2–3; see Cole et al., supra note 72, at 614
n.1; Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77.
86. Khazzoom, supra note 79; Stacey Palevsky, Memoir of Baghdad Recalls Riches of a
Vanishing Culture, JWEEKLY.COM (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/58927/
memoir-of-baghdad-recalls-riches-of-a-vanishing-culture/ (“Khazzoom, now 78, retired from
U.C. Berkeley’s economics department in 2000.”).
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motorists involved in more than one accident, disputed and litigated
claims, and fraud in UM claims, along with a lack of effort or estimate of
87
bias in the calculations. Similarly, accidents with out-of-state insured
88
motorists or stolen vehicles may be counted within UM claims as well.
In an attempt to address this confusion, the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators has advocated a standardization of
89
methods for measurement of uninsured motor vehicles. It advocates
for what it views as the most accurate methods of either random survey
90
techniques or a current database, both of which include considerable
costs beyond the IRC method.
Even the term “uninsured motorist” is a misnomer, since mandatory
91
Some
liability insurance attaches to vehicles, not their drivers.
motorists have more than one insurable vehicle, and may insure one, but
92
not another. In fact, owners of as many as 41% of uninsured vehicles
report that the car, truck or van is uninsured because it is either “not in
93
operating condition” or “runs but . . . is not being used.” Arguably,
these owners should not be included within the uninsured motorist
category, since they claim their vehicles are not on the road. How this
“hybrid” person or his or her vehicle is considered in the various models
can make a significant, if not dramatic, difference in the calculation of
94
the number of uninsured drivers.
The variety of required auto insurance is interesting in and of itself.
95
There are at least thirteen kinds of automobile insurance. Individual
states’ political processes and investigations have apparently led
legislatures to reach very different conclusions as to the appropriate
type of policy, minimum policy limits, methods of enforcement, and
87. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 73–78.
88. AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84, at 3;
Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 75.
89. AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84, at 2–3.
90. Id. at 5–9.
91. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 61.
92. Id. at 62.
93. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 88.
94. See, e.g., AAMVA UNINS. MOTOR VEHICLE RATE WORKING GRP., supra note 84,
at 5, 7; LYN HUNSTAD, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CHARACTERISTICS OF UNINSURED MOTORIST
1–2 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studiesreports/0600-research-studies/auto-policy-studies/upload/Characteristics-of-UninsuredMotorist.pdf.
95. Types
of
Auto
Insurance
Coverage,
AUTOINSURANCE.ORG,
http://www.autoinsurance.org/types-of-auto-insurance-coverage/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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range of penalties in its mandatory insurance requirements.
The
variety of mandated insurance among states ranges from no
requirement at all for those who have not previously had an accident in
97
which they were at fault to no-fault coverage.
Basic liability insurance is the most commonly mandated auto
coverage, which covers damages to another’s property caused by the
98
driver of the insured auto. It does not repair or replace the auto driven
99
by the insured. The two general components of liability insurance are
100
categorized in the industry as bodily injury and property damage.
State laws also specify a minimum amount of coverage as a three-digit
series, stating the amount of coverage for personal injury per person,
101
maximum personal injury for all injured, and property damage.
Mandatory minimums range (in thousands) from $12.5/$25/$7.5 in Ohio
102
to $50/$100/$25 in Maine.
In so-called “no-fault states,” a trend in the 1970s that has largely
been reversed, owners purchase auto insurance that provides coverage
for their own vehicle, its driver, and passengers, regardless of who was at
103
fault in the accident. Today, many no-fault states mandate that auto
owners maintain insurance coverage, even though it applies only to their
104
own vehicle rather than another driver’s. Uninsured or underinsured
motorist auto insurance (UM/UMI) covers damages and losses of
96. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
97. For an interesting comparison of the requirement to carry UM/UMI or no-fault auto
insurance with the Affordable Care Act’s tax levied against the uninsured, see Jennifer B.
Wriggins, Is the Health Insurance Individual Mandate “Unprecedented”?: The Case of Auto
Insurance Mandates (Apr. 6, 2012) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011025.
98. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 24, at 2; Compulsory
Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77 (“Virtually all states require drivers to have auto
liability insurance before they can legally drive a motor vehicle.”).
99. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, supra note 24, at 2 (comparing
“[l]iability” with “[c]ollision coverage” and “[c]omprehensive coverage”).
100. Id.
101. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77; see also, e.g., WIS. STAT.
§ 344.01(2)(d) (2011–2012) (requiring Wisconsin drivers to have insurance covering $25,000
for personal injury per person, $50,000 for personal injury of all people injured, and $10,000
for property damage).
102. See Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra note 77.
103. No-fault insurance was instituted in a number of states during the 1970s, and was
proposed and tried as a response to concerns on tort litigation. See Harrington, supra note 70,
INFO.
INST.
(Jan.
2013),
at
116;
No-Fault
Auto
Insurance,
INS.
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/no-fault-auto-insurance.html.
104. Harrington, supra note 70, at 116.
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vehicle owners who suffer personal injury or property damage due to
105
the fault of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. Some twenty-one
states require vehicle owners to maintain UM/UMI insurance in
addition to liability, in effect compelling the purchase of self-insurance
106
for those vehicles in such circumstances.
Likewise, states chose a wide range of enforcement tactics and
penalties for noncompliance, from fines to impoundment or
107
Insurance companies claim that the cost to states of
imprisonment.
108
enforcing these laws or of required reporting systems, ultimately
passes to the insured through rate increases and higher registration and
licensing fees. Many states require proof of insurance for vehicle
109
registration, but owners can easily drop the insurance once registration
is complete, and short of direct communication with the insurance
carrier itself, it is difficult or impossible for an enforcement officer to
know if a vehicle’s coverage has lapsed. Systems to monitor insurance
coverage and enforce these laws cannot only be expensive, but if
unreliable or out of date, can unnecessarily penalize those in full
110
compliance.
C. The Disjunction Between FEMA’s IVINS Rule and State Insurance
Mandates
Despite its comment that vehicles must meet “the terms of state
law” to be eligible for aid, in practice, FEMA does not appear to adopt
the particular individual state law varieties of required insurance
111
carriage, but simply requires proof of some form of liability insurance.
It is unclear whether it enforces this provision at all in the lone holdout
on mandatory insurance, New Hampshire, which instead requires a
financial responsibility payment only from those drivers who have been
105. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 71, at 1.
106. See Harrington, supra note 70, at 116; Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, supra
note 77.
107. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 615.
108. See, e.g., Despite Compulsory Coverage Laws, Fight Against UMs Marches On,
supra note 34; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers,
Says Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34.
109. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., supra note 61, at 19, 25, 27 (noting that
Alabama, Arkansas, and California, for example, all require proof of insurance upon vehicle
registration).
110. See Knauf, supra note 34.
111. Help After a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program,
supra note 23, at 15; Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
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112

at fault in at least one accident within the state. It seems unlikely that
the level of detail needed to be certain that an auto insurance policy
both meets the state standards and is current—or was at the time of the
disaster—is beyond what most FEMA aid application processing
encompasses in the days and weeks following a major disaster.
Industry experts and scholars have examined the effect of
mandatory insurance auto laws over time, and most studies indicate they
have little to no real impact on the number of uninsured drivers, though
there are some mixed conclusions. The industry has consistently
opposed these laws; some industry publications quote executives’
conclusions that compulsory or mandatory auto insurance rules are not
successful in reducing the number or percentages of uninsured vehicles
113
on our roads.
For example, Lynn Knauf, policy manager for the
Alliance of American Insurers, states that “[m]andatory automobile
insurance reporting programs have never been proven effective in
114
The
reducing the percentage of uninsured drivers on the road.”
industry also complains that insurers bear the costs and burdens of
complying with state regulations on insurance companies, particularly
creation and maintenance of up-to-the-minute databases on policies in
115
Laura Kotelman, PCI regional manager and senior counsel,
force.
agrees: “[C]ompulsory auto insurance laws do not prevent uninsured
drivers from owning or operating a vehicle, and are frequently a
116
harassment to responsible drivers who do maintain coverage.”
Other examinations of the impact of mandatory auto insurance
reach somewhat conflicting conclusions.
A study attempting to
112. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:20 (2012).
113. Some industry analysts believe mandatory insurance laws actually punish insured
drivers by increasing overall costs while having little effect on the number of insured vehicles.
See Knauf, supra note 34. Knauf explains:
Worst of all, insured drivers end up “paying” in three ways: they pay for their own
insurance protection (which includes protection in the event of an accident caused
by an uninsured driver); they pay increased insurance costs; and they often pay
higher registration and licensing fees as the exorbitant costs of these mandatory
insurance enforcement programs are ultimately passed to them.
Id. Knauf was the policy manager of the Alliance of American Insurers at the time of her
statement. Id.
114. Knauf, supra note 34.
115. Id.; Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers,
Says Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34.
116. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34.
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correlate severity of possible penalties for noncompliance with
improvements in compliance rates found a positive correlation between
117
stiff penalties and compliance. One study found a correlation between
more stringent enforcement of mandatory insurance laws and lower
118
levels of uninsured motorist claims. The same study found support for
the corresponding theory that states with more lax laws have higher
levels of uninsured motorists, but also found demographic and price
119
factors to be an influence. Another found that states with mandatory
insurance laws may experience reduced levels of uninsured motorists,
but also found that these drivers have an increased rate of involvement
in auto accident fatalities, which it attributes to a “moral hazard” effect
120
At least one
(the insured’s expectation of lower accident costs).
insurance economist doubts whether the overall effect of such laws
121
actually reduce the costs of auto accidents overall.
More severe penalties do not necessarily translate to higher
compliance with these laws either. A Tulsa, Oklahoma journalist
reported that after his state increased penalties and imposed towing and
impoundment for uninsured vehicles, there was no significant effect on
the number of uninsured motorists, and the rate remained one of the
122
highest in the country at 23.9%. His source, IRC vice president David
123
Corum, said the rate “appear[ed] to be related to the . . . economy.”
Several states have or are experimenting with different approaches to
the problem of uninsured motorists, at least implicitly conceding that
the present mandatory laws are not satisfactorily addressing the
124
concern.
At best, these studies raise serious questions about the
117. Cole et al., supra note 72, at 631–36. One flaw with this study noted by the author is
the use of “average” penalties for violations of mandatory insurance laws. Id. For example,
most people would acknowledge that a range of possible penalties from $100 to $5,000 is
unlikely to result in an average penalty of $2,540 ($5,100÷2) per infraction.
118. Yu-Luen Ma & Joan T. Schmit, Factors Affecting the Relative Incidence of
Uninsured Motorists Claims, 67 J. RISK & INS. 281, 288 (2000).
119. Id. at 287–88, 290.
120. Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident
Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360, 365, 373 (2004).
121. Harrington, supra note 70, at 134.
122. Omer Gillham, State’s Uninsured Drivers Still Rank High, TULSA WORLD (Sept.
14, 2011, 8:07 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=201
10914_11_A13_CUTLIN385388.
123. Id.
124. Cassandra R. Cole & Kathleen A. McCullough, A Review of Some Possible
Solutions to the Uninsured Motorist Problem, CPCU EJOURNAL (Nov. 2007),
available at http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41179f63-2406-4460-
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effectiveness of mandatory insurance laws to prevent uncompensated
damage and injuries, and brings into question whether any purpose is
served by FEMA’s punitive actions postdisaster.
D. Does the Insurance Mandate Discriminate Against Low Income
Survivors?
While there may be differences of opinion as to the value of
mandatory auto insurance laws, there is no question that low- and
moderate-income drivers comprise most of the ranks of uninsured
motorists. These demographics have been consistent over time. In the
IRC’s profile of uninsured motorists developed from a survey in 1989, it
found that motorists most likely to be uninsured were young, with low
125
education, and renting their residences.
Significantly, it also found
that motorists who earned less than $7,500 per year owned 23% of
126
registered vehicles, but accounted for 50% of uninsured vehicles. The
next level of those with incomes between $7,500 and $20,000 accounted
127
Motorists with $20,000 or
for another 22% of uninsured motorists.
more in annual income owned 34% of registered vehicles but accounted
128
for only 16% of uninsured vehicles. Lyn Hunstad conducted a survey
for the California Department of Insurance, published in 1999, and
129
found almost identical demographics. In 2000, Khazzoom summarized
130
a number of sources of information on uninsured motorists and
reported that uninsured motorists are most likely to be young, lowincome, minority males with low levels of education, most likely rent
rather than own a home, to be unemployed or work part-time, and drive
131
older model cars. They are also more likely to have been involved in
132
accidents, which is likely to lead to more expensive insurance
9988-7288bd7de83b%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=114 (subscription required). A number
of other methods of addressing the problem of uninsured vehicles have been proposed,
including improvement of tracking and enforcement, low-cost auto policies, uninsured
motorist coverage, so-called “no-pay, no-play” laws which preclude uninsured drivers from
collecting for damages from insured drivers, and pay-at-the-pump strategies. Id.
125. ALL-INDUS. RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 29, 30
tbls.17, 18, 19 (1989).
126. Id. at 31 tbl.21.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2.
130. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 82–86.
131. Id. at 85.
132. Id. Khazzoom’s data highlights the demographics of uninsured motorists:
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premiums.
A direct correlation alone does not necessarily mean that there is a
causal effect between low-income drivers and lack of insurance.
Inquiries and surveys seeking to discover why motorists do not insure
their vehicles attempt to answer the question. Virtually every study of
uninsured motorists leads to the same conclusion: people do not insure
133
their vehicles for two primary reasons.
First, they do not, or rarely,
134
use the vehicle, or second, they cannot afford insurance. According to
the IRC, over 80% of the owners of uninsured vehicles gave one of
these reasons—41% citing nonuse and 41% citing inability to pay and

Table 4 Profile of Uninsured Motorists
Age: Young Motorists between 18–29 own 28 percent of registered
vehicles. Account for 52 percent of uninsured vehicles. Motorists 45 and
over own 39 percent of registered vehicles. Account for 13 percent of
uninsured vehicles.
Education: Low Motorists with less than a high school education own
17 percent of reg. vehicles. Account for 33 percent of uninsured vehicles.
College grad or post grads own 23 percent of registered vehicles. Account
for 11 percent of uninsured vehicles.
Residence: Rent Motorists renting residence own 26 percent of reg.
vehicles. Account for 50 percent of uninsured vehicles. Motorists owning
residence own 68 percent of reg. vehicles. Account for 40 percent of
uninsured vehicles.
Job Status: Unemployed[/]Part-time Unemployed Motorists own 17
percent of registered vehicles. Account for 33 percent of uninsured
vehicles. Retired motorists own 14 percent of registered vehicles.
Account for 5 percent of uninsured vehicles.
Personal Inc[ome]: Low Motorists with less than $7500 own 23
percent of reg. vehicles. Account for 40 percent of uninsured vehicles.
Motorists with $20,000 or more own 34 percent of reg. vehicles. Account
for 16 percent of uninsured vehicles.
Gender: Mostly Male One estimate for CA showed 70 percent of
[uninsured motorists] are male.
Car Age: Old [One e]xample from Texas[ showed] 58 percent drive
cars more than 10 years old.
Ethnic: Minority Percent varies by state; [minorities] dominant in
some [states,] such as CA, TX.
Driving Record: Evidence [of] Accident Proneness In 1990, CA
percent [of uninsured motorists] was less than 28 percent; yet CHP data for
[1988–1989 show that 55.1–60.9 percent of fatal accidents, 44.6 percent of
bodily injury accidents, and 34.1 percent of traffic citations involved
uninsured motorists].
Id. at 85 tbl.4 (formatting omitted).
133. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88.
134. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 2; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88.
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135

high costs. Arguably, vehicles that are not on the roads or highways
are not involved in accidents, and do not contribute to the problem of
uncompensated damage. Without these vehicles, the pool of uninsured
drivers who plead inability to pay becomes much larger. In fact, if the
unused vehicles are removed from the pool, nearly 70% of uninsured
drivers who are using their vehicles claim to be unable to purchase
136
insurance. Of course, this number would be enhanced by those who
may have simply elected not to have an automobile at all because they
either cannot afford insurance or are deterred by the risk of penalties
for failure to comply with the law. Industry studies and predictions also
indicate that unemployment is a determinative factor in the uninsured
auto rate, anticipating increases during recent years of economic
137
Both the Insurance Industry Institute and the
hardship nationwide.
IRC warned in 2009 that economic downturn and financial hardships
138
would increase the percentage of uninsured vehicles.
Economist Scott Harrington points out the rationality of low-income
139
drivers’ failure to insure. There are few benefits for an investment in
liability insurance for a poor family, in large part because insurance’s
purpose is to compensate others, not the insured. Low-income owners
are less likely to own a home or have other significant assets, making the
risk of the levy of a collectible judgment for damage to another’s car far
140
141
less likely.
Many uninsured autos are older makes and models, so
insuring them comprehensively or against collision is less advantageous.
If injured, Medicaid likely covers low-income parties’ hospital and
142
medical costs. All in all, the risks of being uninsured are so low as to
135. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 5 (“The primary reasons given for not insuring the
vehicle were: vehicle not in operating condition (24%), [cannot] afford to buy it (21%),
premiums were too high (20%), and vehicle runs but is not being used (17%).”); Khazzoom,
supra note 79, at 87–88.
136. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 87–88.
137. News Release, Ins. Research Council, Economic Downturn May
Push
Percentage
of
Uninsured
Motorists
to
All-Time
High
(Jan.
21,
2009)
[hereinafter
News
Release],
available at http://www.insuranceresearch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/IRC_UM_012109.pdf.
138. I.I.I. Sees More Uninsured Drivers as Financial Hardships Loom, INS. ADVOC., Feb.
23, 2009, at 14–15; News Release, supra note 137.
139. Harrington, supra note 70, at 119–20.
140. Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Households and the Auto
Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450.
141. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 6.
142. Harrington, supra note 70, at 116.
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143

justify that economic choice.
To further complicate matters, the Consumer Federation of America
144
(CFA) concluded in a study released in January 2012 that the auto
insurance rates reflect disparate treatment and impacts on low-to145
middle income (LMI) individuals. It estimates that perhaps as many
as one-fifth to one-third of low-to-middle income households—defined
as earning $20,000 or less per year and $40,000 or less, respectively—do
146
not have auto insurance and are operating their vehicles illegally.
Insurance companies are forbidden to use income as a rating factor for
those seeking insurance, but the authors of this study determined that
proxies for income have become more prevalent, permitting indirect
147
Among other practices
discrimination on the basis of wealth.
discovered that militate against LMI drivers obtaining insurance are the
lack of access by lower income families to insurance agencies and
148
149
offices; inability to purchase insurance from some major insurers;
150
being charged higher premiums for less coverage; being charged
143. Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 120, at 361 (citing, e.g. Gur Huberman et al., Optimal
Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules, 14 BELL J. ECON. 415 (1983)); Brobeck & Hunter,
supra note 140 (noting that liability insurance provides “little if any direct benefit[]”).
FED’N
AM.,
144. About
CFA:
Overview,
CONSUMER
http://www.consumerfed.org/about-cfa/overview (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (explaining that
“The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is an association of nonprofit consumer
organizations that was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research,
advocacy, and education. Today, nearly 300 of these groups participate in the federation and
govern it through their representatives on the organization’s Board of Directors.”).
145. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140; CFA Releases Study on Economic Harm to
LMI Households from Over Price Auto Insurance, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/451.
146. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140.
147. Id.
148. Id.
Research suggests that those in LMI urban communities have much less access to
auto insurance offices than do those in higher-income areas. For example, in the
District of Columbia, of [eighty] insurance offices identified, only three were located
in the two wards with the lowest incomes while [forty-five] were located in the two
wards with the highest incomes.
Id.
149. Id. “Some major insurers will not even sell auto insurance to certain types of car
owners” or they charge rates that are so much higher than those of most other insurers that
they clearly are not serious about selling these policies. Id.
150. Id. In at least several states including Arizona, Texas, and Arkansas, and probably
in more, “some major insurers charge [individual consumers] lower premiums for standard
[liability coverage] than for minimum liability coverage. It appears that these insurers are
discriminating against purchasers of the minimum coverage, who are disproportionately LMI
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higher premiums because of rating factors beyond their control such as
151
age, gender, and zip code; being charged higher premiums because key
152
rating factors are largely ignored; being charged very high premiums
153
for force placed coverage; and being treated unfairly in the claims
154
process.
Combining the information to consider the effects on the willingness
and ability of low-income auto owners to purchase auto liability
insurance, we can see a disturbing confluence of problems. The reasons
for lack of compliance with the laws are many, and the cost is one of the
most problematic. Liability insurance ranges from around $700 to
155
Possible discrimination against the poor only
thousands per year.
exacerbates that effect. As a result of all of these factors, those with
vehicles of relatively little value and few assets have little incentive to
incur the expense of auto insurance.
III. STAFFORD ACT PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND FEMA’S IVINS RULE
Economic discrimination in conducting disaster response policy and
car owners.” Id.
151. Id.
In general, LMI car owners are disadvantaged by rate classification systems used by
insurers. They pay higher premiums because insurers use rating factors, such as
[location of] residence, occupation, education, and credit rating, which [they claim]
are often correlated with risk. But insurers often have not adequately demonstrated
to regulators that these correlations exist or that they actually [adequately] reflect
risk . . . .
Id. Some of these factors, individually and in aggregate, may be “surrogates for income,” a
factor forbidden from use in all states. Id.
152. Id. “One important factor” not adequately taken into account by rating systems, to
the detriment of LMI families, is miles driven annually. Id. “LMI car owners drive far fewer
miles annually than do higher-income owners—about half the miles of those in the top
income quintile but the lower risks associated with fewer miles driven are not adequately
recognized by rating systems.” Id.
153. Id. “Collision and comprehensive coverage purchased by auto lenders for
borrowers without this coverage is . . . expensive because, as they do for most types of credit
insurance[,]” lenders charge insurers large commissions that effectively represent
“kickbacks.” Id. “These commissions are the main reason that, according to one study, loss
ratios on forced place coverage [the percentage of premiums dollars paid out in claims]
averaged [twenty-five] percent, well below the industry average of more than [sixty] percent.”
Id.
154. Id. “To quote one plaintiff’s attorney who used to work for insurers, ‘it’s easier [to
deny claims to] the sick, the weak, and the poor than [to] someone who is big and tough.’” Id.
155. Id.

08 HORNSBY (DO NOT DELETE)

764

4/13/2013 5:13 PM

[96:735

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
156

actions is expressly prohibited in the Stafford Act.
Concerns about
how low-income individuals and families might fare in disaster situations
appear in the legislative history of the federal disaster response at least
157
as early as 1973. In a report to Congress at that time from a special
taskforce appointed to revamp the Disaster Preparedness Act under the
Nixon administration, the authors make clear a concern that the
“needy” are especially vulnerable to disaster and may not qualify for
158
disaster loans available to those of more means.
The legislative
159
history of federal disaster legislation continues to reflect this concern.
The result is expressly evident in 42 U.S.C. § 5151, where economic
status is given equal weight with protections for discrimination on the
160
basis of race, gender, and national origin. The statement is repeated in
FEMA’s regulations, providing that aid requests and responses shall be
accomplished without discrimination on the grounds of “race, color,
religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or
economic status,” similar language has appeared in disaster response
161
legislation since the 1970s. If data supports the premise that a policy
requiring liability auto insurance discriminates against those of low and
moderate income, FEMA’s insurance requirement may well violate this
provision.
A. Possible Challenges to the Mandatory Liability Insurance
Requirement by FEMA
FEMA has acknowledged that, in its own words, “people who are
economically disadvantaged will always be more in need of federal
disaster assistance,” but made the point that this inevitable fact does not
162
mean its actions are discriminatory. To date, it appears that no court
156. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
157. See, e.g., To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief
Legislation Part 5, supra note 50, 168 (statement of George M. Elsey, President, American
National Red Cross).
158. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-100, at 12 (1973).
159. See supra notes 42–62 and accompanying text.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a).
161. Id.; see Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 311, 88 Stat. 143, 150
(“[R]elief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial
manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or
economic status.”).
162. McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters II), 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D. La. 2006)
(quoting Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 3, McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (No. 05-5488),
2006 WL 703656, which reads: “[P]eople who are economically disadvantaged will always be
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has found that any FEMA policy or decision is in violation of its
nondiscrimination provision.
An individual or group, or more likely a pro bono organization on its
behalf, who wishes to have FEMA alter or reconsider the auto insurance
qualification, would face a number of legal hurdles. A court action
163
Sovereign
would first face jurisdictional and immunity issues.
immunity, as any law student can explain, prevents legal action against
government actors unless the government has expressly given its
164
consent to be subject to review, and a suit against any federal agency
or a federal official acting in an official capacity is a suit against the
165
sovereign.
Furthermore, FEMA is protected by a Stafford Act
166
provision that articulates its own nonliability protection. Section 5148
of the Act states that the government “shall not be liable for any claim
based upon the [agency’s] exercise or performance of, or a failure to
167
The identical
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”
168
language appears in its regulations.
Stated in the affirmative, the
provision asserts protection from liability for agency actions in carrying
169
out discretionary functions.
A review of recent cases suggests the government has taken a very
broad view of what FEMA actions are “discretionary” so as to fall
within the protections, at times arguing that FEMA has a unique
position due to its particular mission and claiming a different standard
more affected by a disaster than other persons, and will always be more in need of federal
disaster assistance”).
163. See generally Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 941 (5th Cir.
1999).
164. See generally DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF
LAW: THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 79–80 (2005).
Sovereign immunity in the United States today has two functions. First, it
disables individuals (wholly or partially) from seeking relief from a governmental
entity for unlawful harm done or threatened. . . .
Second, the Supreme Court has instructed that sovereign immunity upholds the
dignity interest of a sovereign in not being summoned either into its own courts or
into the courts of some other sovereign.
Id.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 44 C.F.R. § 206.9 (2011).
169. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (“This provision ‘preclude[s]
judicial review of all disaster relief claims based upon the discretionary actions of federal
employees.’” (quoting Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987))).
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of discretionary acts than that applied to other federal agency actions
170
operating with similarly functioning protections.
Several courts have had the opportunity to consider challenges to
FEMA decisions, practices, and policies under various theories of
171
liability and with consideration of a government immunity defense.
The most likely sources of authority for judicial review of the mandatory
insurance provision are: (1) violation of FEMA’s statutory provisions;
172
(2) the Administrative Procedures Act; or (3) constitutional violations.
Examination of each of these theories and the guidance and rules
emerging from courts addressing individuals’ challenges to FEMA
action (or inaction) is instructive in determining the parameters of
jurisdiction and standards of review applied to this particular agency’s
policies and practices.
B. The Scope of FEMA Nonliability
The Stafford Act provides that the government “shall not be liable
for any claim based upon the [agency’s] exercise or performance of, or a
173
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”
Courts are directed to consider the nature of the activity carried out by
the agency or its agent, not the identity of the actor, in determining
174
whether a particular challenge is appropriate for judicial review. What
constitutes a “discretionary function or duty” establishes the parameters
175
for the judicial jurisdiction over nonmonetary challenges to FEMA.
Like other agencies, the basic parameters of FEMA’s sovereign
immunity protect it not only from liability, but from the requirement of
176
Procedurally, these become
defending its actions at all.
determinations of whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain the
177
Defining what is
action claim heard as a motion to dismiss.

170. See, e.g., Graham, 149 F.3d at 1006.
171. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (addressing constitutional
violations); St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 318 (5th Cir. 2009) (alleging
violations of FEMA’s statutory provisions); Graham, 149 F.3d at 1000 (suing under the
Administrative Procedure Act).
172. See, e.g., supra note 171.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (restated in 44 C.F.R. § 206.9).
174. See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
175. See, e.g., St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 317–18.
176. Id. at 318.
177. Id. at 315 n.3.
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discretionary and what is not has been the cornerstone to jurisprudence
assessing when a court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an agency
178
action. Therefore, the essential initial inquiry in a request for judicial
review of a FEMA policy, such as the auto liability insurance mandate,
is whether it is a discretionary act to establish and enforce that eligibility
179
If Congress granted FEMA that authority, a court
requirement.
180
cannot properly reach the merits of the claim.
1. FTCA Precedent and FEMA’s “Propinquity” Standard
FEMA has aggressively asserted a broad interpretation of the
nonliability immunity defense in motions to dismiss since the earliest
181
Recently, it has taken the position that
challenges to its actions.
judicially created standards applied to other agencies under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Federal Tort Claims Act
182
(FTCA), both long used as precedent, are inapplicable to it.
Moreover, FEMA contends that the Stafford Act intended a different
183
definition of “discretionary” to apply to FEMA. So far, courts have
declined to accept these arguments, but while the boundaries of
FEMA’s nonliability provision have been addressed in district courts
and certain courts of appeals, the holdings have not directly addressed
the arguments and decisions have been limited to the facts of the cases

178. Id. at 318–19.
179. See, e.g., id. at 310.
180. Id. at 326 n.13.
181. See, e.g., Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998).
182. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 313–14.
183. Id. at 318–19; Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 380 (1983). The Ornellas
court relied on the following statement as evidence of Congress’s intent to bar all claims
regarding disaster relief:
We have further provided that if the agencies of the Government make a
mistake in the administration of the Disaster Relief Act that the Government may
not be sued. Strange as it may seem, there are many suits pending in the Court of
Claims today against the Government because of alleged mistakes made in the
administration of other relief acts, suits . . . because citizens have averred that the
agencies and employees of Government made mistakes. We have put a stipulation
in here that there shall be no liability on the part of the Government.
Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11,912 (1950) (statement of Rep.
Whittington)). The statement came from debates regarding the Disaster Relief Act of 1950,
in which the discretionary function exception first appeared. See Disaster Relief Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109, 1110. The court took this statement to mean Congress
“inten[ded] to raise a statutory barrier to judicial review.” Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380.
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184

before the courts.
Consequently, this argument may continue to
185
appear in subsequent FEMA litigation.
The government first took this unprecedented position in 2006 postHurricane Katrina litigation. It objected to the use of FTCA analysis to
determine what constituted discretion given to an agency by Congress,
claiming that FEMA’s unique mission to respond to disaster required
186
The government asserted that
application of a unique standard.
FEMA’s immunity from suit was not coterminous with that proscribed
under the FTCA, and that it should be subject to a different—
presumably much broader—standard of “propinquity” to the
187
“Propinquity,” defined by Merriam-Webster
disaster or emergency.
188
as “nearness in place; proximity . . . nearness in time,” would require
courts to take into consideration the context of disaster response
decisions. The government contended that the Stafford Act vests the
United States with full discretion in its provision of disaster assistance,
leaving the courts only to determine whether the conduct complained of
189
occurred in the course of carrying out the agency’s charge. If the court
agreed, FEMA would not be subject to judicial review for any actions
190
taken in conducting disaster relief.
FEMA made the argument
simultaneously in two cases pending in the Fifth Circuit, although in
191
both cases it first raised the issue on appeal. The government, though
it acknowledged that the plain language of the statute limited immunity
to “discretionary function[s] or dut[ies],” took the position that
Congress intended FEMA to have a far greater, basically unfettered,
immunity from judicial review than other agencies when acting in
192
response to a disaster.
The Fifth Circuit claimed that it would not address the argument
184. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.
2008).
185. Id. at 188.
186. Id. at 195–97.
187. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319.
188. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1551 (2011).
189. Brief for Appellees at 10–11, St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d 307 (No. 08-30070),
2008 WL 6122721 (“[T]he essential inquiry for the court is whether the actions (or inactions)
complained of occurred in the course of ‘carrying out the provisions of [the Stafford Act].’ If
it does, sovereign immunity should bar the claim.” (citation omitted)).
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id.; St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319 n.7; see also Freeman v. United States, 556
F.3d 326, 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2009).
192. Brief for Appellees, supra note 189, at 10–11.
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since it had not been made to the trial court, but made clear that it did
193
not agree to adopt a new standard.
The opinion in St. Tammany
Parish declined to directly address the statutory interpretations relied
on by the government to support its new interpretation of § 5148, but
dismissed the government’s merits by holding that “discretionary
function or duty” has the same meaning in both the Stafford Act and the
194
The opinion quotes the identical relevant language of the two
FTCA.
195
provisions, the legislative history evidencing that Congress intended to
adopt the FTCA standard, and other courts of appeals applying the
196
FTCA case law in FEMA cases. It found no difference in application
197
to the case before it or reason to depart from the traditional analysis.
The decision comports with every court to date that has addressed
FEMA’s defense of protection under the “discretionary action”
exception by applying the standard and precedent developed in
198
The circuits that have addressed this
interpretations of the FTCA.
199
issue have expressly used this standard, and none has rejected it.
Plaintiffs can be relatively confident that they will continue to do so,
despite any novel arguments to the contrary from the government.
2. Administrative Procedures Act Application
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) has also been relied
upon by those seeking injunctive or other nonmonetary relief from
200
FEMA. As it did specifically in the Stafford Act for FEMA, Congress
generally waived sovereign immunity for nondiscretionary agency action
201
via a 1976 amendment to the APA.
According to § 701(a) of the
APA, federal agencies’ actions or inactions are subject to judicial review
193. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319 n.7.
194. Id. at 319.
195. Id. at 320 (“Compare [42 U.S.C.] § 5148 (exempting claims based on ‘the exercise or
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty’), with
[28 U.S.C.] § 2680(a) (exempting claims based on ‘the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty’).”).
196. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 320.
197. Id.
198. E.g., id. at 320 & n.8. The FTCA statute was originally enacted as Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–42, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47,
and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
199. St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 319–20.
200. E.g., City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
201. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 702–703 (2006)).
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unless “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
202
committed to agency discretion by law.” In practical effect, the statute
creates a parallel to FEMA’s and FTCA’s provisions, and, again, results
in the need for a court to consider whether the agency action was
203
“discretionary” before affirming its jurisdiction.
The government has also disputed jurisdiction for judicial review of
FEMA activity via the APA, claiming that FEMA falls within the
204
It argued in McWaters v.
exception created in part one of § 701(a).
FEMA (McWaters II) that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity
does not apply to FEMA because § 5148 of the Stafford Act acts
independently to “preclude judicial review” of the actions about which
205
plaintiffs complained. No court has specifically reached the issue, yet,
of whether the parameters of the APA and FEMA are completely
coterminous, but one federal district court held that, having determined
that the functions and duties rendered by FEMA under the Stafford Act
206
were “discretionary” pursuant to its § 5148, the APA was inapplicable.
Given the precedent on the application of FTCA immunity analysis to
FEMA, and the fact that the two standards are so similar in meaning, it
seems very unlikely that a court would find that a different standard
applied to determining whether a FEMA action was discretionary under
the APA as opposed to the Stafford Act. If those definitions remain the
same, plaintiffs need not attempt to rely on the APA, and the pursuit of
a claim under the APA is simply redundant in regard to the treatment of
discretionary acts, though it may have application elsewhere in a
challenge to a FEMA process.
Moreover, before a court can consider whether an action challenged
pursuant to the APA is discretionary, the decision must be “final” in
207
Until a final agency action has
order to be reviewed in the courts.
202. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006).
203. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (E.D. La. 2006).
204. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, McWaters
II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (No. 05-5488), 2006 WL 638603.
205. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
206. Id.
207. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Section 704 reads:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the
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been undertaken, the agency presumably still has authority to resolve
208
the matter, leaving a court without jurisdiction.
FEMA used this
rationale to assert in some actions that plaintiffs must exhaust their
209
administrative remedies before seeking a court’s review.
In Lockett v. FEMA, the government asserted a “failure to exhaust
administrative remedies” defense, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims
were not final because they had not appealed their individual decisions
210
pursuant to the Stafford Act.
The Lockett court found that, unlike
many other agencies, the Stafford Act provides FEMA applicants with
only an informal procedure and permissive opportunity for appeals with
211
no formal adjudication or process for review. It relied on the United
212
States Supreme Court decision in Darby v. Cisneros, which explained
that an agency may avoid the finality of an initial administrative decision
only if it satisfies dual factors. The agency must have adopted a rule
that an appeal be taken before judicial review is available and the rule
213
must provide that the initial decision is inoperative pending appeal.
Otherwise, the initial decision becomes final and the aggrieved party is
214
Because the Stafford Act’s appeal
entitled to judicial review.
215
procedure does neither, exhaustion of remedies is not required before
216
seeking court review of an initial FEMA denial.
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO
THE FEMA’S IVINS RULE
A. Discretionary Act?
Presumably, under current case law, a court entertaining an action
against FEMA would apply the well-established test stated in Berkovitz
purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an
application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
Id.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., Lockett v. FEMA, 836 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 853.
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993).
Lockett, 836 F. Supp. at 852–53.
Id. at 853.
See 44 C.F.R. § 206.101(m)(1) (2011).
Lockett, 836 F. Supp. at 853.
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v. United States to determine what actions, practices, and policies fall
217
within its discretionary activities. In Berkovitz, the Court established a
218
First, the court
two-pronged approach for this determination.
examines whether a “choice or judgment” is involved in the
performance of the agency function, and looks to see if that choice or
judgment is “not tempered by a statute, regulation or policy which
219
If agency action is
mandates a particular course of action.”
constrained in some fashion, it is mandatory, not discretionary, and not
220
immune from suit. If the first prong is satisfied, then a second prong
questions whether the activity in question is grounded in social,
221
economic, or political activity. If the second prong is also satisfied, the
agency had discretionary authority over the decision, and its action is
outside the waiver of sovereign immunity and not subject to judicial
222
review.
For guidance, a frequently relied upon United States Supreme Court
case clarifying and summing up the application of the Berkovitz
223
The Gaubert court
standard is found in United States v. Gaubert.
articulated the purpose of the discretionary function exception as
intended to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political
224
policy through the medium of an action in tort.” The Court clarified
that not only did the challenged act involved need to be nonmandatory,
but that even discretionary actions must clearly satisfy the second
Berkovitz prong and be “grounded in the policy of the regulatory
regime,” in order to escape the waiver of sovereign immunity provided
225
by the discretionary function exception. The scrutiny suggested in this
inquiry is tempered, however, by a presumption that an agency’s or an
agent’s acts are grounded in policy whenever exercising the discretion

217. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
218. Id. at 536–37.
219. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. La. 2006) (citing Berkovitz, 486
U.S. at 536–37).
220. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
221. Id. at 537; see also McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
222. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
223. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991).
224. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
225. Id. at 325, 328–29.
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226

granted by Congress.
To analyze whether a court might view the policy decision of
mandatory auto liability insurance by FEMA as a discretionary function,
a court would first consider the statute and regulations regarding
“financial assistance . . . to address . . . other necessary expenses or
serious needs,” under which aid for transportation falls, to see if a
227
“judgment or choice” is involved. Case law makes clear that there is
no question that decisions to grant or deny disaster aid pursuant to
228
FEMA policy are discretionary. FEMA’s statutes give it the authority
to establish eligibility standards and to make determinations of who
229
meets its established criteria. The Stafford Act provisions pertaining
to individual and household aid are replete with the language of
230
discretion. The lacing of aid provisions with permissive language has
led courts to frequently characterize awards of disaster financial
231
As the Ninth Circuit held,
assistance from FEMA as “gratuitous.”
“decisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited
governmental resources are the type of administrative judgment that the
232
discretionary function exception was designed to immunize from suit.”
The provision or withholding of virtually every FEMA benefit has been
233
deemed a discretionary act, and immune from suit.
If the question of FEMA’s insurance policy is reframed from
whether it has discretion to use liability insurance as a criterion to
whether it has the authority to do so without notice and comment
rulemaking, the analysis looks more promising. Stated differently, does
FEMA have the discretion to include this policy in its decision factors
without formal regulations and rules procedures, or is that process
“mandatory,” and hence, beyond the protection of the § 5148 immunity?
Though most of the Stafford Act’s aid provisions are written in

226. Id. at 324.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Berkovitz v. United States.,
486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
228. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013–14 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998); see also supra note 20 (highlighting the
President’s delegation of powers to FEMA).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 5174; see also City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 5174; see also City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
231. See, e.g., Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 380 (1983).
232. Graham, 149 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
233. See id.
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permissive terms, giving the President and his authorized agents the
option to act or to make determinations of functions and process, a few
provisions give no such choice. Two statutory provisions could possibly
be implicated in a challenge to the auto insurance mandate, either
§ 5174(j)’s directive to promulgate rules and regulations regarding
234
eligibility standards or § 5151(a)’s instruction to do the same to protect
against discrimination on the basis of economic status in the granting of
235
aid. Each includes requirements that regulations “shall” be made, and
§ 5151 states the regulations “shall” include provisions that relief and
236
Generally,
assistance are provided in a nondiscriminatory manner.
agencies are directed by Congress to implement such rules and
regulations as are needed to effectuate their missions and must proceed
through the formal rulemaking process set out in the Administrative
237
Procedures Act. Central to the APA’s functioning is the requirement
238
The auto
of public notice and the opportunity for public comment.
insurance eligibility requirement, binding on disaster survivor
239
applicants, was not promulgated and vetted in this fashion.
A district court in southern Texas was presented this question in
regard to regulations governing aid for housing repair, challenged by
plaintiffs as vague, and generally insufficient to satisfy the rulemaking
240
In La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, the court
mandates.
distinguished the provisions in the nondiscrimination statute, § 5151,
241
from those in the eligibility for aid statute, § 5174.
It found the
regulatory mandate in § 5151 to be discretionary, noting that despite the
“shall issue” language, the mandate is tempered by the language that
references only “such regulations as may be necessary for the guidance
242
Read as a whole, the court found that the section
of personnel.”
provides that as such regulations are made, they shall include provisions
to assure the assistance is accomplished in a nondiscriminatory

234. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j).
235. § 5151(a).
236. §§ 5151, 5174.
237. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
238. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 35–41.
240. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, No. B 08 487, 2009 WL 1346030, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. May 13, 2009), vacated, 608 F.3d 217, 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2010).
241. Id. at *7; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5151(a), 5174(j).
242. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *4, *6–8; 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a)
(emphasis added).
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243

manner. It is questionable whether the regulations adopted to enact
§ 5151 actually provide methods of ensuring that FEMA activities do
244
not discriminate. Instead, they provide assurances that the agency will
not discriminate, and will create policies it “shall make available to
employees, applicants, participants, beneficiaries, and other interested
parties” information on “this regulation and its applicability to the
programs or activities conducted by the agency” in “such manner as the
245
head of the agency finds necessary.”
Still, the agency did enact
regulations in some manner, and a court would likely be reluctant to
find that the vagueness was so deficient as to have failed to comply with
the regulation mandate.
The La Union del Pueblo Entero court contrasted the permissive
language of the modifications of § 5151’s directive regarding the
establishment of regulations with that of § 5174(j), which states
unequivocally that “[t]he President shall prescribe rules and regulations
to carry out this section [setting out various types of aid to individuals
and households], including criteria, standards, and procedures for
246
The trial court granted the
determining eligibility for assistance.”

243. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *4; 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a); 44 C.F.R. § 206.11 (2011). The relevant portion of 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.11 reads:
Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance.
(a) Federal financial assistance to the States or their political subdivisions is
conditioned on full compliance with 44 CFR part 7, Nondiscrimination in FederallyAssisted Programs.
(b) All personnel carrying out Federal major disaster or emergency assistance
functions, including the distribution of supplies, the processing of the applications,
and other relief and assistance activities, shall perform their work in an equitable
and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion,
nationality, sex, age, or economic status.
(c) As a condition of participation in the distribution of assistance or supplies
under the Stafford Act, or of receiving assistance under the Stafford Act,
government bodies and other organizations shall provide a written assurance of
their intent to comply with regulations relating to nondiscrimination.
(d) The agency shall make available to employees, applicants, participants,
beneficiaries, and other interested parties such information regarding the provisions
of this regulation and its applicability to the programs or activities conducted by the
agency, and make such information available to them in such manner as the head of
the agency finds necessary to apprise such persons of the protections against
discrimination assured them by the Act and this regulation.
Id.
245. 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(d).
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5151, 5174(j).
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247

plaintiffs injunctive relief on this basis.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the decision, though it
248
agreed entirely with the trial court as to the nature of the two statutes.
Rather, it found that the rules and regulations provided by FEMA
pursuant to § 5174 were not so lacking as to ensure plaintiffs substantial
likelihood on the merits, and consequently the matter was not
249
appropriate for injunctive relief.
Only if the court found the
regulations “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute”
would it have agreed with the trial court, noting that within limits, courts
250
should grant deference to agency exercise of delegated powers.
The auto liability insurance requirement presents a somewhat
different context. The same mandatory provision of § 5174(j) applies to
all individual and household aid, and creates the obligation to enact
“rules and regulations” regarding the granting of aid to disaster
251
Unlike the provisions of the Stafford Act at issue in La
survivors.
Union del Pueblo Entero, challenged on the basis that they were vague
252
and unclear, and thus insufficient to satisfy the statute, the eligibility
qualifications in regard to auto insurance requirements have never
appeared at all in the Federal Register or the C.F.R. They were never
published for comment prior to their taking effect. In that sense, a more
applicable case law comparison might be MST Express v. Department of
253
Transportation.
By law, the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) was directed to prescribe by regulation the specific initial and
254
continuing requirements for safety fitness.
MST Express, a trucking
company, claimed that the FHWA’s procedures for determining its
“safety fitness rating” were unlawful because they “were not
administered even-handedly and [were] therefore arbitrary and
255
capricious.” FHWA countered that it had met its legal obligation and
was not subject to the rulemaking requirements because it had merely

247. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *10.
248. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, 608 F.3d 217, 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2010).
249. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j).
250. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 608 F.3d at 223 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j).
252. La Union del Pueblo Entero, 608 F.3d at 223.
253. MST Express v. Dep’t of Transp., 108 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
254. Id. at 402; see 49 U.S.C. § 31144(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
255. MST Express, 108 F.3d at 401–02.
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256

issued “interpretive rules.” The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals held that FHWA had not complied with its congressional
directive to establish regulations for a differently stated reason: the
agency had not established its rating via notice and comment
rulemaking. Accordingly, it vacated the decision of the FHWA on the
257
basis of its informally established criteria.
Here, FEMA is similarly using a criterion that has not complied with
its statutory directive to “prescribe rules and regulations” establishing
the “criteria, standards, and procedures for determining eligibility for
258
assistance.”
Or, more accurately, it is enforcing a criterion for
eligibility that is not among the regulations it did promulgate in its
259
regulation, and the court held that conduct violated its obligations. If
a court is persuaded that FEMA has not complied with this
“mandatory” duty, it could invalidate the auto liability insurance
mandate criteria to qualify for financial aid for a disaster-damaged
vehicle.
V. “ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO
STATUTE,” OR AN “ABUSE OF DISCRETION”?
A different approach in seeking judicial review could assert that the
auto liability mandate prerequisite to transportation aid is “arbitrary,
260
capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute,” which would permit a
court to eradicate the use of that eligibility factor. Under the APA,
actions found “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
261
The La Union del
not in accordance with law” will be set aside.
Pueblo Entero opinion by the Fifth Circuit made clear that while the
regulations it reviewed were within the boundaries of the discretion of
FEMA’s authority and challenges on lack of specificity are unlikely to
262
be deemed acceptable, that discretion is not unbounded. Neither does
the examination of the facts end by determining that FEMA had
authority to set its eligibility policy. As the Supreme Court stated in
256. Id. at 405.
257. Id. at 406.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also supra note 20 (highlighting
the President’s delegation of powers to FEMA).
259. MST Express, 108 F.3d at 402; 44 C.F.R. § 206.113 (2011).
260. This controlling standard for agency review was established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
261. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
262. See La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA, 608 F.3d 217, 224 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, “[t]o make this finding
the court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
263
error of judgment.”
The insurance qualifying factor may be vulnerable to claims that
FEMA has abused its discretion in its application. The language at the
end of the FTCA’s immunity provision includes “whether or not the
discretion be abused,” but this same phrase does not appear in the
264
In St. Tammany Parish, the Fifth Circuit turned the
Stafford Act.
government argument claiming that the parameters of FEMA’s
discretion were different from that of the FTCA on its ear, by pointing
265
out that missing language. The same question had been raised, but not
reached, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re World Trade
266
Center Disaster Site Litigation. If FEMA had its way in the argument
denying application of the FTCA standard, in a classic “be careful what
you wish for” scenario, it could have strengthened an argument that
even its discretionary action can be abused. Plaintiffs parsing the two
provisions for comparison may exploit that difference; the argument is
certainly open to consideration.
FEMA has never articulated a sound reason for adopting
263. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1977).
264. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011), with 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011).
265. St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 321, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We also
note that § 2680(a) [of the FTCA], unlike [42 U.S.C.] § 5148, prohibits claims ‘whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.’ Thus, the FTCA may protect against abuses of discretion,
while the Stafford Act may not.”); see In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d
169, 189 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008).
We need not decide whether this distinction has any meaning in this case because
the Parish has not argued that the government abused its discretion (it has limited
its argument to whether the government had any discretion at all). We note this
difference here only as additional evidence that our holding does not render § 5148
superfluous.
St. Tammany Parish, 556 F.3d at 322 n.9.
266. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d at 189 n.21.
We note that immunity under the FTCA appears somewhat broader than that under
the Stafford Act, as the FTCA adds ‘whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Whether this suggests that the discretionary function
immunity contained in the Stafford Act does not protect a government agency or
employee from charges of abuse of discretion is a question we need not reach.
Id.
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compliance with state law as a valid criterion on which to base the award
of transportation benefits. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict how the
government might address the contention that the requirement is
arbitrary and capricious. In Beno v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit stated
that a court should not “infer an agency’s reasoning from mere
267
silence.” Thus far, FEMA has offered no reasoning for this rule, and
certainly has not demonstrated that it has “consider[ed] . . . relevant
268
factors.”
It would be difficult to argue that refusing aid to those
without liability insurance somehow furthers the mission of FEMA.
269
The demographic profiles of uninsured motorists, seem to fall well
within the categories of needy and disadvantaged disaster survivors
about whom Congress expressed concern when considering disaster
270
The failure to assist the uninsured in this one
response legislation.
category, and not in any other category of uninsured losses, is
inexplicable. Though this argument seems promising, we are warned
that “[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
271
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION?
As we know, the Stafford Act’s nonliability statute does not invoke
the full spectrum of sovereign immunity for FEMA. Courts have
clarified that § 5148 protection runs only to nondiscretionary acts, and
272
unlike the FTCA, may not even protect against abuse of discretion. A
defense of virtually complete immunity and lack of jurisdiction over all
claims against FEMA, even constitutional ones, seems unlikely to result
273
in a wholesale dismissal. Nevertheless, consistent with its far-reaching
view of immunity under the Stafford Act, the government has taken the
position that § 5148 protects FEMA from challenges of unconstitutional

267. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d. 1057, 1073–74 (9th Cir 1994).
268. Id.
269. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85 tbl.4.
270. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
271. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1977).
272. St. Tammany Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009); In re World
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 189 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008).
273. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812–13 (E.D. La. 2006); McWaters v. FEMA
(McWaters I), 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228–29 (E.D. La. 2005).
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274

conduct.
In McWaters II, a district court case also brought by
Hurricane Katrina survivors in 2005, challenging several actions and
procedures by FEMA in providing rental assistance and housing
benefits, the government sought dismissal of constitutional violations on
275
the basis of immunity. Plaintiffs brought claims against FEMA on the
basis of violations of the Stafford Act, Due Process Clause, and
Administrative Procedure Act and sought injunctive and declaratory
276
relief. The McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters I) court’s opinion reflects a
somewhat incredulous tone addressing the contention that FEMA is
immune from suit for constitutional violations, remarking that “it is also
the government’s position that FEMA may commit unconstitutional
277
Indeed, in
acts and likewise not be subject to judicial review.”
McWaters II, the government took the position that “this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction” even though plaintiffs allege various
278
As the Supreme Court has explained, the
constitutional violations.
United States must waive sovereign immunity for a court to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over it, even if the plaintiff alleges a
279
Relying on Lynch v. United States, the
constitutional claim.
government asserted that FEMA is immune from suit arising from
280
constitutional causes of action.
Judicial review of agency action alleged to be unconstitutional has a
conflicted history, with courts taking positions that, carried to logical
274. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
275. Id. at 805, 811–12.
276. McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
277. Id. at 228.
278. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
279. Id. at 811–12 & n.16 (mentioning that FEMA “adamantly denies any
unconstitutional action or any unlawful acts”). This is not merely a characterization of
FEMA’s position by the court. In its post-trial brief, the government contented that:
Further, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction even though plaintiffs allege
various constitutional violations. As the Supreme Court has explained, the United
States must waive sovereign immunity for a court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over it, even if the plaintiff alleges a constitutional claim. “The
sovereign’s immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or
the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of action
arising under acts of Congress, and to those arising from some violation of rights
conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution.”
Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 162, at 4 (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571, 582 (1934)).
280. Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 162, at 4 (citing Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934)).
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281

conclusions, are hard to reconcile.
The Supreme Court stated in
Califano v. Sanders, “when constitutional questions are in issue, the
availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a
statutory scheme to take the ‘extraordinary’ step of foreclosing
jurisdiction unless Congress’ intent to do so is manifested by ‘clear and
282
convincing’ evidence.” In the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1987
decision, Rosas v. Brock, the court stated “[i]t is far from clear that
Congress could prevent judicial review of unconstitutional agency
283
action.” Yet reasoning from other circuits leaves the question open, at
284
least theoretically.
The precedent in respect to the context of constitutional questions
regarding FEMA conduct in distributing benefits is clearer. The
McWaters II court relied on Rosas in holding that constitutional
questions such as the one presented to it were, indeed, subject to
285
It agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that agency conduct
review.
consistent with the Constitution is not a discretionary act, but a
286
mandatory one.
Once again, the “discretionary function”
determination was dispositive as to the question of jurisdiction for
287
judicial review.
Despite the government’s arguments contending that FEMA is
subject to immunity from review of allegedly unconstitutional acts,
arguments the government may well attempt in other circuits, it seems
likely that a court would find constitutional questions raised by the
adoption of a policy alleged to be discriminatory to be within its scope
of review. In such a case, a court would likely at least examine the
merits of the alleged acts to see if plaintiffs state a colorable claim for an
unconstitutional act or omission, as did the McWaters II court.

281. For discussion of the complexity of this issue, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.9 (5th ed. 2010).
282. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 762 (1975)).
283. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad.
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986); Campbell v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 694
F.2d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[I]t is well-established that Congress cannot preclude judicial
review of allegedly unconstitutional agency action . . . .”)).
284. PIERCE, supra note 281, § 17.9.
285. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 n.18, 813 n.20 (E.D. La. 2006).
286. Id. at 813 n.20.
287. Id. at 812–14.
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A. Due Process
Challenges to FEMA actions for denial of benefits have sometimes
been brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. To
establish a due process violation, plaintiffs must show that they have a
protected property interest and that “FEMA’s procedures are
288
constitutionally inadequate.” Government benefits may be a form of
property protected by the due process clause, but not all such benefits
289
are within its protections. The United States Supreme Court has held
that only where a person has a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to a
benefit, and not a mere “abstract need or desire” or a “unilateral
expectation” of receipt of the benefit does the due process protection
290
arise.
291
In Ridgely v. FEMA, plaintiffs received rental assistance after
Hurricane Katrina pursuant to section 408 of the Stafford Act, which
deems individuals eligible for certain financial benefits if he or she is
displaced from a home rendered uninhabitable as a result of a major
292
The section’s corresponding regulations set out the criteria
disaster.
293
for both the initial application and continued rent assistance. The four
representative Ridgely plaintiffs were each displaced from their homes
294
and received financial rent assistance as a result of the disaster. Each
representative plaintiff was told that the assistance would cover three
months’ rent but that they could apply for additional funds in the future,
295
After the expiration of the period granted, they then
if necessary.
received retroactive notices that they were no longer eligible for the
296
assistance, with little time to find alternative housing. Moreover, some
were told they must repay what they had received since the
297
determination on ineligibility. They contended they had an interest in

288. Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
289. Id. at 735.
290. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 70 n.2 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
291. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 727.
292. Id. at 729; see 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
293. 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.113–.114 (2011).
294. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 729–30.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 730.
297. Complaint at 24, 28–31, Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146, 2007 WL 1728724 (E.D.
La. June 13, 2007), vacated, Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008).
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the ongoing housing assistance that was wrongly taken without proper
298
procedures.
Addressing the question of whether the rent assistance created a
property interest needed to support a due process obligation on the part
of FEMA, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in an analysis and
299
comparison of FEMA benefits to other government benefits. First, it
examined the statutory language to determine the level of discretion
300
given to the agency. To find a property interest, the court must first
find “explicitly mandatory language, i.e., specific directives to the
decisionmaker [sic] that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are
301
present, a particular outcome must follow.” The court examined both
section 408 and its corresponding implementation regulations, finding
302
that each was written in entirely permissive, not mandatory, terms.
Next, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs—who were
receiving rental assistance—acquired a property interest in the
303
The lower court accepted the
continued payment of benefits.
argument that once granted the benefit the plaintiffs were entitled to
continued assistance, and therefore, plaintiffs had a property interest
sufficient for due process procedures to be guaranteed under the
304
Constitution. Relying on United States Supreme Court decisions that
held continuing benefits from Social Security and welfare created a
305
property interest, on appeal plaintiffs disputed the government’s
position that the quarterly payments were effectively a termination and
306
reissuance of rental aid.
They noted that the three-month term for
benefits is simply an informal policy of FEMA for its own convenience
and purposes, not consistently applied, and that continuation of the
benefits is similar to other benefit programs where continued or
298. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 734–35.
299. Id. at 736–37.
300. Id.at 736.
301. Id. at 735–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)).
302. Id. at 736.
303. Id. at 738–40.
304. Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146, 2007 WL 1728724, at *6 (E.D. La. June 13, 2007).
305. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (holding that a social
security benefit was property interest sufficient for due process protections); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–64 (1970) (finding that plaintiffs who were denied welfare benefits
had a property interest in those benefits which entitled them to a due process hearing));
Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 736.
306. Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 731–32, 738 n.10.
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occasional assurance of the recipient’s ongoing qualification is
307
required. All in all, the court found the facts failed to establish that
plaintiffs had a property interest sufficient to support a due process
308
claim.
A plaintiff claiming benefits pursuant to the “financial assistance”
309
provisions of the Stafford Act and its regulations would have
substantial difficulty establishing a “property interest” in such benefits
because of the permissive nature of the laws and regulations establishing
authority for that relief. Accordingly, a due process challenge to the
insurance mandate seems unlikely to be successful.
B. Equal Protection
A claim regarding the auto liability eligibility factor under the Equal
Protection Clause could have more legs than a Due Process claim. A
claim against FEMA for economic discrimination would be both a
310
Stafford Act statutory violation and an equal protection violation. A
plaintiff might succeed in obtaining judicial review—or at least prevail
against a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction—of a FEMA decision
that allegedly constituted a constitutional violation, even if the
implementation and application of the policy would otherwise be
considered a “discretionary function” and immune from suit under
311
Here, an action that alleged discrimination on the basis of
§ 5148.
economic status is more likely within the jurisdiction of the courts, so
312
long as the constitutional claim is “colorable.”
How a challenge on that basis would fare in an Equal Protection
analysis is, at very best, uncertain. The United States Supreme Court
“has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for
313
purposes of equal protection analysis.” Actions which affect those of
different economic status, treated as a nonsuspect classification, are
subject to profound deference so long as the agency actions have any
314
Unless a
rational relationship to a legitimate end of government.
307. Id. at 738 n.10.
308. Id. at 740.
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
310. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 817–18, 820–21 (E.D. La. 2006).
311. Id. at 813, 818; see supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.
312. See McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
313. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
314. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17, 28–29.
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practice involves a fundamental right, such as voting or trial level
indigent criminal defense—to which this right clearly does not rise—
courts consider a regulation that may discriminate on the basis of
economic status to be one concerning economic and social welfare
policy and a legitimate exercise of governmental authority and
315
discretion.
Categorized in that manner, the FEMA insurance
eligibility factor cannot be held to the higher level of scrutiny applicable
316
to suspect classes, such as the strict scrutiny applied to racial
317
or the intermediate scrutiny applied to gender
classification
318
classifications.
In that respect, the insurance mandate is not significantly different
than other class “rational basis” questions presented to the United
States Supreme Court. Professor Robert C. Farrell noted in a 1999
article that between 1971 and 1996, in only ten Supreme Court cases did
a plaintiff defeat a rational basis defense by the government; one
319
hundred had failed.
None of those cases involved an economic
320
While the mandatory insurance requirement does not
classification.
321
appear to be “rationally related” to the purposes of the Stafford Act,
315. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486–87, rehearing denied 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
316. The grating of a gratuitous benefit, such as aid from FEMA, is not the kind of right
protected by heightened scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982) (“In
determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed
has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein.”).
317. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
318. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
319. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999).
320. Id. at 411 (“The groups disadvantaged in these ten cases were newcomers, out-ofstaters, hippies, undocumented aliens, the mentally retarded, non-freeholders, and gays.”
(footnotes omitted)).
321. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006 & Supp. V
2011)).
It is the intent of the Congress, by this Act, to provide an orderly and
continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and
damage which result from such disasters by–
(1) revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief
programs;
(2) encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and
organizations by the States and by local governments;
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the bar is so low for FEMA to find a relationship to its mission that a
court might be obliged to find in the agency’s favor. FEMA does have a
charge to “encourag[e] individuals” to obtain insurance, which might be
322
sufficient to justify its use as an eligibility factor. Still, it is a stretch of
logic to think that a policy that would not protect the property at issue in
any event and that only affects a vehicle owner postdisaster has the
effect to “encourage” households to comply with state liability insurance
laws. It is difficult to imagine a family who cannot afford auto liability
insurance being motivated to purchase it nonetheless in the unlikely
event that a major disaster were to threaten their personal
323
transportation.
VII. POLITICAL ACTION
One solution that would avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of
a legal challenge to the FEMA requirement of auto liability insurance
would be political action by the legislative or executive branch. An
informal, but binding, rule such as the auto insurance mandate could be
altered within the agency itself or through direction from Congress,
FEMA’s administration, or other executive branch authority. FEMA
324
has an Office of Equal Rights, which as far as can be determined, has

(3) achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster
preparedness and relief programs;
(4) encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace
governmental assistance;
(5) encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
disasters, including development of land use and construction regulations;
and
(6) providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private
losses sustained in disasters[.]
42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). The Stafford Act also included “(7) providing a long-range economic
recovery program for major disaster areas.” Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 101, 88 Stat. 143, 144 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4).
323. Stephanie K. Jones, Uninsured Drivers Travel Under the Radar, INS. J., Aug. 18,
2003, at 20, 21 (“‘I think given choices and a limited amount of money, most people will
choose to pay their rent first, feed their kids second or some order thereof,’ said Texas
Insurance Commissioner Jose Montemayor. ‘And I think insurance falls pretty quickly a
distant choice. Unfortunately, this is reality.’”).
324. Civil Rights Program, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/civil-rights-program (last
updated July 16, 2012). FEMA explains the function of the Office of Equal Rights:
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yet to be presented with this issue. Pursuit of this type of action seems
worth the effort in light of the benefits to poor disaster survivors and the
alternative of lengthy and uncertain legal battles.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Transportation is critical in disaster response, recovery, and
rebuilding. Obtaining basic shelter, food, water, and medical assistance
in the days, weeks, and years following a disaster will likely require
more dependence on private transportation than predisaster routines.
Assuring that households and individuals may become as self-reliant—
and available to help others—as quickly as possible is a highly
325
desirable goal and absolutely essential to the larger good. Unrepaired
and damaged vehicles on the roads can be dangerous to both their
passengers and others. It is counterintuitive and a direct impediment to
recovery for federal disaster response to provide assistance for repair
and replacement of personal vehicles, only to deny assistance to those
326
unable to afford private insurance.
The FEMA policy serves no
purpose other than to punish auto owners who have not complied with
327
state mandatory liability insurance laws —a goal totally unrelated to

Complaints Resolution - Applicants for or recipients of FEMA federal funds,
services or benefits who believe they have been discriminated against may contact
the Office of Equal Rights (OER) to obtain complaint processing assistance.
Generally applicants are described as the general public or disaster survivors (i.e.
persons who have applied for individual disaster assistance) and contractors or subgrantees (i.e. person, company or state/local entity that has applied to be awarded or
has been awarded FEMA federal funds.) Furthermore, person or persons who
represent the “general public, disaster survivors, contractors or sub-grantees” can
also obtain complaint processing assistance from OER.
The matter will be looked into informally by an Equal Rights Specialist. If the
issue cannot be resolved informally, a formal written complaint may be filed with
OER.
This office is responsible for processing complaints, issuing
acknowledgements and acceptance/dismissals; conducting investigations and
compliance reviews; and issuing final decisions.
Id.
325. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEMA PUBLICATION 30 (1st ed. Nov. 2010),
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/pub1.pdf [hereinafter FEMA PUBLICATION]
(“The response mission seeks to conduct emergency operations to save lives and property
through positioning emergency equipment, personnel, and supplies; evacuating survivors;
providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public
services.”).
326. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
327. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No
Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet
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the critical need of assisting those whose lives have been affected by a
major disaster.
This effect is even more questionable when the state law that FEMA
is enforcing against survivors is of questionable value in coping with the
328
real problem of uninsured vehicles on our roads. Mandatory liability
insurance may have a worthy goal of assuring that drivers on our roads
will be covered for bodily injury and property damage caused by at-fault
uninsured vehicle drivers, and states are certainly within their rights to
enact and enforce auto insurance mandates to address the problem. The
effectiveness of these laws, however, is highly questionable in truly
329
reducing the problem of uninsured drivers. While that decision is, of
course, left to state legislators, wholesale adoption of these laws by a
federal government agency with no relation to the problem is
inexplicable.
Moreover, the demographics of uninsured motorists illustrate that
they are largely low income and cite the expense of auto insurance as
the primary reason for failure to comply with mandatory liability
330
insurance laws.
An almost equal number are not insuring a vehicle
331
because it is not currently being used, a rational reason that could be
remedied should a previously unused vehicle be needed. These owners
are denied any assistance with repair in the event of damage from a
332
disaster, even if they were to insure the vehicle in the future. Thus,
even those who would insure a car once operational, or to add it to an
existing policy, cannot get the help they may need to secure necessary
transportation postdisaster. The disproportionate effect of mandatory
insurance laws is exacerbated by indications that insurance companies
may discriminate against low-income drivers in both subtle and direct
333
Use of proxies such as credit ratings and other demographics
ways.
allow insurance companies to, in effect, use the prohibited consideration
334
of income as a factor in extending coverage.
Basic liability policies
the terms of state law.”).
328. Mandatory Auto Insurance Does Not Reduce Number of Uninsured Drivers, Says
Insurer Trade Group, supra note 34.
329. Id.
330. Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85, 87.
331. HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 5.
332. See Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23.
333. CFA Releases Study on Economic Harm to LMI Households from Over Price Auto
Insurance, supra note 145 (referring to Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140).
334. Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 140.
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may cost more than full coverage for some drivers, and low-cost policies
give such little protection that they may not be worth the expense to a
335
household of few means.
Incorporating state auto insurance laws into a FEMA policy that
penalizes survivors of disaster for lack of compliance directly conflicts
with its larger policy goals and missions of assisting in disaster response,
336
recovery, and rebuilding. Under the circumstances of most uninsured
vehicle owners—those too poor to qualify for low-interest loans—the
denial of financial assistance to repair or replace the auto serves no
purpose consistent with FEMA’s mission. The value to the federal
government of this eligibility roadblock is dubious, and one wonders
how it came about.
Finally, FEMA’s adoption of this requirement without rulemaking is
troubling. The Stafford Act requires that rules for eligibility for benefits
be promulgated with opportunity for comment and response. Despite
that directive, the liability insurance requirement appears only in the
most informal sources, with no rationale offered other than to comply
337
with state laws. The lack of rulemaking renders the informal policy a
potential statutory violation and has prevented an open forum in which
to discuss the role of FEMA, the needs of disaster survivors denied
benefits on the basis of lack of auto liability insurance, and the futility of
attempts to enforce a variety of state laws in a disaster response context.
FEMA may be most vulnerable to judicial review of the policy by way
of this failure of process, since neither the Stafford Act nonliability
provisions nor principals of sovereign immunity will protect it from
judicial review where the disputed action is mandatory, such as in
338
§ 5174(j).
Ironically, the cost of providing this aid is one of the lesser expenses
encountered in disaster response. It is difficult to estimate the number
of affected households, since the total includes not only denials on the
lack-of-liability-insurance basis, but also those who did not apply
because the published criteria, information from the agency
representatives, or legal advice led them to believe it was futile.

335. Id.
336. FEMA PUBLICATION, supra note 325, at 17.
337. Why am I Not Eligible for Assistance?, supra note 23 (“IVINS-Vehicle - No
Liability Insurance: Disaster assistance may not be provided for a vehicle that does not meet
the terms of state law.”).
338. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5148, 5174(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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However, the permissible maximum amount granted per claim for all
339
“other” (nonhousing) needs is $15,000, and the average grant is $2,000.
This relatively small amount could be sufficient to restore a vehicle to
operation or it could be pooled among households to purchase a shared
vehicle. We know that a large percentage of uninsured vehicles are
older models, many more than ten years old, and may have retained
340
Only those with the most desperate financial
little monetary value.
situations—those unable to qualify for SBA low-interest disaster
341
loans—would be within the grantees. Yet, one can easily imagine that
the availability of transportation could make the difference in the ability
to become self-reliant after a disaster.
Court challenge, agency action, or reconsideration by the
administration of FEMA’s position on this policy is warranted. FEMA
339. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, UNIT 7: INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE 7.7 tbl.
(2010), available at http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/IS208A/08_SDM_Unit_07_508.pdf.
FEMA describes the limits of “Other Needs Assistance” in its Disaster Assistance for
Individuals and Business Owners Table. Id. The Table is divided into “Program/Agency”
and lists the “Assistance,” “Eligibility,” “Specific Criteria,” and “Supplemental Materials
Reverence” associated with each program or agency. Id. For the “IHP: Other Needs
Assistance” program, “[a]dministered and funded by FEMA,” the Table lists the
“Assistance,” “[g]rants to meet serious disaster-related needs and necessary expenses not
covered by insurance or other Federal, State, or voluntary agencies;” the “Eligibility,”
“[a]vailable to persons and households with serious unmet needs who do not qualify for SBA
disaster loans;” the “Specific Criteria,” “[m]aximum grant of up to $15,000[] depending on
family composition and needs,” noting that the “[c]ap changes each fiscal year to
accommodate Consumer Price Index” but that “[t]he average grant is approximately $2,000;”
and the “Supplemental Materials Reverence,” “IHP Fact Sheet.” Id.
340. See HUNSTAD, supra note 94, at 6; Khazzoom, supra note 79, at 85 tbl.4.
341. Do I Qualify for “Other Than Housing Needs” Assistance?, FEMA,
http://www.fema.gov/do-i-qualify-other-housing-needs-assistance (last updated June 25,
2012). FEMA states the eligibility for “Other Than Housing Needs” as follows:
To receive money for “Other Than Housing Needs” that are the result of a disaster,
all the following must be true:
You have losses in an area that has been declared a disaster area by the
President.
You have filed for insurance benefits and the damage to your property is not
covered by your insurance or your insurance settlement is insufficient to meet your
losses.
You or someone who lives with you is a citizen of the United States, a noncitizen national, or a qualified alien.
You have necessary expenses or serious needs because of the disaster.
You have accepted assistance from all other sources for which you are
eligible, such as insurance proceeds or Small Business Administration disaster loans.
Id. (emphasis added).
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acknowledges that “[r]ecovery focuses not only on saving and sustaining
lives, but also on providing for the short- and long-term needs of
342
individuals and communities.” If a thoughtful, thorough examination
of the effects of the auto insurance mandate were undertaken in light of
FEMA’s true purpose, the questions regarding the legality and the
wisdom of the policy create difficulty justifying retention of the
standard.

342. FEMA PUBLICATION, supra note 325, at 35.

